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NO DEFENSE FOR SELF-DEFENSE:
DETERMINING WHETHER COURTS SHOULD
ORDER INSURERS TO REPRESENT INSUREDS
WHO HAVE ACTED IN SELF-DEFENSE
Alex Dzioba*
The right to defend oneself has traditionally been heavily protected by
courts in all scenarios. However, the refuge that an act of self-defense
provides becomes muddled in the context of an insurance agreement. State
courts are split on whether an insured who claims to have acted in selfdefense is entitled to legal representation and compensation from the
insurer in light of an insurance contract containing an intentional injury
exclusion clause. This clause is used virtually uniformly throughout the
insurance industry and it has caused courts to ponder if an act of selfdefense fits within the language of such a clause, and, consequently, if an
act of self-defense should be excluded from insurance coverage. This Note
analyzes both the textual and public policy arguments that are set forth by
the proponents of each side of this dispute as well as the lines of reasoning
courts use in justifying their divergent rulings. Taking this analysis into
consideration, this Note ultimately concludes that acts of self-defense
should be excluded from coverage when traditional policy terms are used.
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INTRODUCTION
You are attacked in your own home. You fight back. You have done
nothing wrong, yet your insurance company asserts that it is not legally
obligated to cover your damages or represent you. This might not seem
fair, but what if you previously agreed to let the insurance company off the
hook? This situation is created by intentional injury exclusion clauses that
are found in personal liability insurance contracts.
An intentional injury exclusion clause prevents the insured from
recovering damages that he caused on purpose.1 Many would agree that
acts of self-defense fit within this definition based solely on a literal

1. See 10 COUCH
rev. ed. 2011).

ON INSURANCE

§ 140:64 (Lee R. Russ & Thomas F. Segalla eds., 3d
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reading.2 On the other hand, many would also agree that appropriate force
used in self-defense should be a heavily protected right.3 Then again, a
contract is no more than what its terms state, and a basic precept of contract
law is to allow individuals the freedom to contract as they see fit.4 As
evidenced by this back and forth, courts that encounter this type of suit face
a difficult decision, and their decisions have been anything but consistent.5
Part I of this Note gives a background on the insurance industry,
specifically personal liability insurance. This overview begins with a look
at the basic structure of insurance policies and some key provisions that are
common to most policies. This Part next provides an analysis of adhesion
contracts and how insurance policies fit into that analysis. A summary of
some important rules of construction and the competing principles of selfdefense and freedom of contract concludes Part I.
Part II provides a breakdown of how different courts have interpreted
intentional injury exclusion clauses in the context of self-defense and the
arguments advanced on behalf of both the insurer and insured. Part II first
examines the competing assertions that can be made from a textual analysis
of this exclusion clause. This discussion focuses on how courts and
commentators have interpreted the terms “intended” and “expected” as used
in exclusion clauses. Part II concludes by analyzing the opposing sides’
views regarding public policy concerns relating to this issue.
Lastly, Part III asserts that courts should rule that acts of self-defense are
excluded from coverage where there is an intentional injury exclusion
clause. Part III reaches this conclusion through a plain reading of the text,
by considering public policy arguments, and by determining the most
pragmatic approach.
I. BETTER SAFE THAN SORRY: AN OVERVIEW OF INSURANCE POLICIES
AND THE FACTORS THAT AFFECT COURTS’ INTERPRETATIONS OF THEM
While most people in the United States have some form of insurance,6
often times insured individuals will not bother to read or understand the
terms of their insurance contracts.7 In light of this, this section begins with
an overview of how liability insurance works and the common provisions
2. See, e.g., Weight v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 782 F. Supp. 2d 1114, 1128 (D. Haw.
2011); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Marshall, 554 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 1997). But see Walters
v. Am. Ins. Co., 8 Cal. Rptr. 665 (Ct. App. 1960) (holding that an element of wrongfulness
or misconduct is connoted within exclusion clauses and finding that self-defense falls outside
of the literal meaning of the terms).
3. See McDonald v. City of Chi., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3023 (2010); Scribner v. Beach, 4
Denio 448, 450 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1847).
4. See Smiley v. Kansas, 196 U.S. 447, 456 (1905).
5. See infra Part II.
6. Health Insurance, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/
hlthins/data/incpovhlth/2011/highlights.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2013) (indicating that in
2011, 84.3 percent of Americans had some form of health insurance).
7. Spychalski v. MFA Life Ins. Co., 620 S.W.2d 388, 392 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981)
(referencing life insurance policies); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211
cmt. b (1981) (suggesting that the insurance industry does not expect the contracts to be
read).
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that can be found in such policies (specifically, the intentional injury
exclusion clause). Next, this Note discusses the insurance contract in the
context of adhesion contracts. A short description of the pertinent rules of
construction that are commonly used for insurance contracts follows. This
section ends with an analysis of the competing principles of self-defense
and freedom of contract as they relate to intentional injury exclusion
clauses.
A. Liability Insurance Basics
Insurance is a contractual security against anticipated loss where the risk
of loss is occasioned by some future event and is shifted to the insurer.8
The insurer accounts for this risk through the receipt of a premium paid by
the insured that is placed into a general fund.9 This Note focuses on
liability insurance, one type of insurance where intentional injury exclusion
clauses are commonly found.10
1. Policy Fundamentals
Liability insurance covers an insured’s liability to others for injuries or
property damage for which the insured is legally responsible.11
Furthermore, liability policies specify that the insurer has a duty to defend
the insured against third party claims.12 A liability insurance policy only
provides coverage for those hazards that are expressly covered by the terms
of the policy.13 To remain covered under an insurance policy, the insured
must make timely premium payments as specified under the terms of the
agreement.14 The premium constitutes the insured’s consideration for the
contract and, as a general rule, it must be paid prior to the time period
intended to be covered.15
Although insurers offer many different types of liability insurance
policies,16 intentional injury exclusion clauses are most prevalent in
8. 1 COUCH ON INSURANCE, supra note 1, § 1.6.
9. Id.
10. See 1 NEW APPLEMAN LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE § 1.09 (Matthew Bender ed.,
rev. ed. 2012) [hereinafter APPLEMAN] (explaining that courts will seek to determine if the
results of the insured’s conduct were intended or expected under a standard comprehensive
general liability policy).
11. Lou-Con, Inc. v. Gulf Bldg. Servs., Inc., 287 So. 2d 192, 206 (La. Ct. App. 1973);
Ryan Homes, Inc. v. Home Indem. Co., 647 A.2d 939, 942 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994).
12. 1 APPLEMAN, supra note 10, § 1.01.
13. Mem’l Props. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 46 A.3d 525, 532 (N.J. 2012) (“Courts cannot
‘write for the insured a better policy of insurance than the one purchased.’” (quoting
Flomerfelt v. Cardiello, 997 A.2d 991, 996 (N.J. 2010))); see also Westfield Ins. Co. v.
Porchervina, No. 2008-L-025, 2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 5466, at *7–10 (Ct. App. Dec. 12,
2008) (holding that emotional distress injuries are not covered under the policy definition of
“bodily injury”).
14. Brooks v. La. Citizens Fair Plan, 4 So. 3d 899, 903–04 (La. Ct. App. 2009).
15. 1 APPLEMAN, supra note 10, § 2.05.
16. Some of the more common liability insurance policies include: comprehensive
general liability, directors and officers liability, homeowners/renters liability, professional
liability, automobile liability, and aviation liability. Id. § 1.01.
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comprehensive general liability (CGL) insurance and homeowners
insurance.17 CGL policies encompass the standard types of coverage of
liability risk arising out of the operations of a business.18 In this sense,
CGL policies are essentially the business equivalent of homeowners
insurance.19 Both of these policies generally cover the insured’s liabilities
for bodily injury or property damage caused to others.20 While coverage is
typically limited to damage occurring on the insured’s property, policy
coverage may be extended in certain cases.21
Liability insurance policies are not necessarily uniform for every
customer that seeks a specific type of insurance.22 Individual negotiations,
applicable state regulations, and evolving judicial rulings all serve to
differentiate insurance policies developed by the same insurer.23
Nevertheless, the insurance industry has made the concept of standardized24
forms a key component to its success.25 This has resulted in many
commonalities that can be seen in all liability insurance policies, especially
in terms of the structure of policies.26
A liability contract will generally consist of five parts: (1) the
declarations page, (2) the insurance agreement, (3) exclusion provisions, (4)
customized riders, and (5) conditions for coverage.27 The declarations page
is a summary of the policy that contains all of the essential terms stated in
an abbreviated form.28 Although it is viewed as a summary, the
declarations page and its provisions are part of the policy, and its language
is binding.29 The insurance agreement, often referred to as “the policy,”

17. Id. §§ 1.03, 1.09; ALLSTATE INS. CO., ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY STANDARD
SELECT
VALUE
HOMEOWNERS
INSURANCE
POLICY
16,
available
at
http://insurance.mo.gov/consumers/home/documents/AP148.pdf (last visited Sept. 20, 2013).
18. 1 APPLEMAN, supra note 10, § 1.03.
19. See id. (noting that in addition to bodily injury and property damages, CGL policies
also cover personal and advertising injury).
20. Id.
21. See, e.g., Herring v. Horace Mann Ins. Co., 795 So. 2d 209 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2001) (holding that liability arising out of the insured’s use of a golf cart at an off-premises
golf course will generally be covered under the insured’s homeowners policy).
22. 1 APPLEMAN, supra note 10, § 1.01.
23. Id.
24. Oftentimes, insurance companies will use standardized policies developed by the
Insurance Services Office, Inc. (ISO). The ISO is a nonprofit organization, to which most
insurance companies belong, that submits these standardized forms to insurance regulators of
different states for approval. Other insurers may use forms developed by the American
Association of Insurance Services or develop their own forms. 2 APPLEMAN, supra note 10,
§ 13.02.
25. See infra Part I.B.3.
26. See 1 APPLEMAN, supra note 10, § 1.01.
27. Id. § 1.02.
28. Todd v. Mo. United Sch. Ins. Council, 223 S.W.3d 156, 160 (Mo. 2007).
29. See Renz v. Allstate Ins. Co., 763 A.2d 1072, 1074–75 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001).
Where the declarations page is in conflict with other provisions within the policy, the
provision is deemed to be ambiguous and the proper rules of construction should be applied
to resolve this ambiguity. See Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Nat’l Sec. Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 741 So.
2d 424, 426–27 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999); Williams v. Farmers Ins. Co., 212 P.3d 403, 406
(N.M. Ct. App. 2009).
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spells out the rights and obligations of both parties.30 Most policies also
contain exclusion provisions, such as an intentional injury exclusion clause,
which serve to narrow the liability of the insurer in circumstances where the
insured would normally be covered under the insurance agreement.31 An
insurance policy may also contain customized riders that are attached to the
standardized policies.32 Riders contain negotiated provisions between the
insurer and an individual insured that modify the general terms of the
policy.33 Lastly, the conditions section explains additional duties for the
insured, including timely notice of a claim and full cooperation with any
insurer investigation.34
2. Insurer Duties
In addition to a standard structure of policies, the obligations of insurers
are also fairly uniform throughout the insurance industry because of
standard provisions and case law.35 The two most essential obligations of
an insurer are the duties to indemnify and to defend.36 The duty to
indemnify is straightforward.37 The insurer must compensate the insured if
the damages incurred by the insured are covered by the policy.38 The duty
to defend is much broader and is completely separate from the duty to
indemnify.39
To satisfy the duty to defend, an insurer must retain counsel for the
insured and direct the defense of the suit against the insured.40 If a conflict
of interest arises, the insurer may be ordered to provide for independent
counsel.41 An insurer’s duty to defend begins when the insured files a
claim that may potentially fall within the individual’s policy.42 “[I]f the
injured party states a claim, which, qua claim, is for an injury ‘covered’ by
the policy . . . it is irrelevant that the insurer may get information . . . which
indicates . . . that the injury is not in fact ‘covered.’”43 The insurer must
continue to defend the insured “until all possible theories of recovery which
could be covered by the policy are eliminated.”44
30. 1 APPLEMAN, supra note 10, § 3.03.
31. Id.; see also ALLSTATE INS. CO., supra note 17, at 16.
32. See Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 400
(5th Cir. 2008).
33. See id.
34. 1 APPLEMAN, supra note 10, § 3.03.
35. See QBE Ins. Corp. v. Brown & Mitchell, Inc., 607 F. Supp. 2d 762, 767 (S.D. Miss.
2008); 1 APPLEMAN, supra note 10, § 1.05.
36. See 1 APPLEMAN, supra note 10, § 1.05.
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. See Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 55 Cal. Rptr. 3d 844, 850–51
(Ct. App. 2007).
40. 1 APPLEMAN, supra note 10, § 1.05.
41. See 14 COUCH ON INSURANCE, supra note 1, § 202:20.
42. See 1 APPLEMAN, supra note 10, § 1.05.
43. Lee v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 178 F.2d 750, 751 (2d Cir. 1949) (applying New York
law).
44. Northland Ins. Co. v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 327 F.3d 448, 457 (6th Cir. 2003)
(applying Michigan law); see also Farmers & Mechs. Mut. Ins. Co. of W. Va. v. Cook, 557
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Of course, the insurer may seek to have the court determine as a matter of
law that the insured is not entitled to the duty to defend.45 This can be
accomplished through a motion for summary judgment.46 An insurer’s duty
to defend has traditionally been determined solely on a reading of the
complaint against the insured and the insurance policy.47 This is known as
the “eight corners” rule.48 If the allegations of the complaint lead the court
to believe that the offenses would fall within the terms of the insurance
policy, the insurer will be required to honor his duty to defend.49
Perhaps in an attempt to expand this bright-line rule, insurers have
trended towards conducting their own investigations relating to their duty to
defend on individual claims.50 This has encouraged some jurisdictions to
shy away from strictly adhering to the eight corners rule in favor of
allowing external evidence (most likely discovered by the insurer) to be
admitted.51 However, this expansion of permissible evidence can also serve
to protect the insured.52 In many jurisdictions, if the insurer has uncovered
facts illustrating that the insured is entitled to policy coverage, the insurer
must uphold its duty to defend even if the complaint’s allegations do not
sufficiently support such a conclusion.53
3. Intentional Injury Exclusion Clauses
Determining the insurer’s obligations does not end the inquiry. The
essential question in a coverage dispute is, under what circumstances must
the insurer honor its duties? Personal liability insurance typically provides
coverage on an “occurrence” basis.54 An occurrence is defined as an
accident which results in bodily injury or property damage neither intended
nor expected from the insured’s standpoint.55 Courts have defined the term
accident as an event that is “unexpected, unusual, and unforeseen.”56
S.E.2d 801, 806 (W. Va. 2001) (noting that the insurer may be obligated to defend suits that
are “‘groundless, false or fraudulent’” (quoting Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Pitrolo, 342 S.E.2d
156, 160 (1986))).
45. See West v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 591 So. 2d 1358, 1360 (La. Ct. App. 1991).
46. See, e.g., id.
47. See Nat’l Cas. Co. v. Vigilant Ins. Co., 466 F. Supp. 2d 533, 538 (S.D.N.Y. 2006);
Cluett v. Med. Protective Co. 829 S.W.2d 822, 829 (Tex. App. 1992).
48. Cluett, 829 S.W.2d at 829. This rule is referred to as the eight corners rule because
the court examines the four corners of the complaint in conjunction with the four corners of
the insurance policy. Essex Ins. Co. v. Café Dupont, LLC, 674 F. Supp. 2d 166, 169–71
(D.D.C. 2009).
49. See, e.g., Truck Ins. Exch. v. Vanport Homes, Inc., 58 P.3d 276, 282 (Wash. 2002)
(en banc).
50. 14 COUCH ON INSURANCE, supra note 1, § 200:17.
51. See, e.g., Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 55 Cal. Rptr. 3d 844,
850 (Ct. App. 2007); Cunningham v. Universal Underwriters, 120 Cal. Rptr. 2d 162, 167
(Ct. App. 2002); Peterson v. Ohio Cas. Grp., 724 N.W.2d 765, 774 (Neb. 2006).
52. 2 APPLEMAN, supra note 10, § 6.02.
53. Id.
54. See 9 COUCH ON INSURANCE, supra note 1, § 126:29.
55. See id.
56. Corder v. William W. Smith Excavating Co., 556 S.E.2d 77, 82 n.12 (W. Va. 2001);
see also Mass. Bay Ins. Co. v. Vic Koenig Leasing, Inc., 136 F.3d 1116, 1124 (7th Cir.
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Assuming that there has been an occurrence, the insured will be covered if
the damage has taken place in the coverage territory, it occurs during the
policy period, and the insured did not know of the damage prior to the
policy period.57
Nevertheless, even if the insured conforms to these requirements, his
actions may fall under an exclusion provision.58 This would prevent the
insured from being covered by the policy.59 This Note focuses on the
intentional injury exclusion.
An intentional injury exclusion clause is designed to deny insurance
coverage to those who cause damage on purpose.60 If the insured can
control the risk of damage, the central concept of insurance is violated.61
Compensating the insured for intentional acts incentivizes him to destroy
property where the value of the insurance is greater than the property’s
actual value.62 Furthermore, the insured could do harm to others with few
financial repercussions.63 As a result, even where there is no explicit
exclusion clause within the contract, courts may still impose this
exclusionary provision as a matter of public policy.64
B. Adhesion Contracts
Courts’ interpretations of insurance contract provisions are often heavily
influenced by the idea that insurance contracts are contracts of adhesion.65
Therefore, this section presents an in-depth discussion on adhesion
contracts. This section defines adhesion contracts and looks at some of the
harmful consequences of using them. It then discusses these features in the
context of insurance contracts.
1. Definition and Features of Adhesion Contracts
An adhesion contract is traditionally defined by the following seven
characteristics:
(1) The document whose legal validity is at issue is a printed form that
contains many terms and clearly purports to be a contract.
1998) (applying Tennessee law); State Bancorp, Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Ins. Co., 483
S.E.2d 228, 234 (W. Va. 1997).
57. 1 APPLEMAN, supra note 10, § 1.07.
58. Id. § 3.03.
59. Id.
60. See Woida v. N. Star Mut. Ins. Co., 306 N.W.2d 570, 572–73 (Minn. 1981) (en
banc). Acting intentionally to create a risk conflicts with the universal insurance principle
known as the “fortuity doctrine,” which states that an act must be fortuitous to be subject to
insurance coverage. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Gulf Ins. Co., 901 S.W.2d 495, 501 (Tex. App. 1995)
(explaining that any event that is a certainty is not fortuitous and, therefore, to allow a person
to insure against the occurrence of such an event would be patently unfair to the insurer).
61. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Freyer, 411 N.E.2d 1157, 1159 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980).
62. See Med. Soc’y of N.Y. v. Serio, 800 N.E.2d 728, 731–32 (N.Y. 2003) (explaining
that a common type of insurance fraud is to purchase insurance on a wrecked or salvaged
vehicle, get into an accident, and collect for feigned damages).
63. See id.
64. See Isenhart v. Gen. Cas. Co. of Am., 377 P.2d 26, 27–28 (Or. 1962).
65. See infra Part II.B.2.
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(2) The form has been drafted by, or on behalf of, one party to the
transaction.
(3) The drafting party participates in numerous transactions of the type
represented by the form and enters into these transactions as a matter of
routine.
(4) The form is presented to the adhering party with the representation
that, except perhaps for a few identified items (such as the price term), the
drafting party will enter into the transaction only on the terms contained
in the document. This representation may be explicit or may be implicit
in the situation, but it is understood by the adherent.
(5) After the parties have dickered over whatever terms are open to
bargaining, the document is signed by the adherent.
(6) The adhering party enters into few transactions of the type represented
by the form—few, at least, in comparison with the drafting party.
(7) The principal obligation of the adhering party in the transaction
considered as a whole is the payment of money.66

Scholars fear that the adhering party in these contracts usually does not
read some, or all, of the terms.67 Whether it is because the terms of the
contract are too detailed and complicated for the ordinary consumer to
understand,68 or that the manner in which the contract is presented does not
permit the consumer time to understand the terms,69 there is a fear that
consumers do not know what they are getting themselves into.70 In fact,
empirical studies have shown that consumers commonly do not read
standardized adhesion contracts.71 Furthermore, courts and legal scholars
agree that those who make regular use of these contracts have come to
expect that customers will not read them.72
A basic tenet of contract theory is that when a person signs a contract,
that individual is assenting to the entire agreement.73 This principle has
been carried over into the area of adhesion contracts despite the evidence
that consumers often do not explicitly assent to the entire agreement.74
66. Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 1173, 1177 (1983).
67. See id. at 1179; William M. Lashner, Note, A Common Law Alternative to the
Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in the Construction of Insurance Contracts, 57 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1175, 1176 (1982).
68. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. b (1981).
69. W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of
Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 540 (1971) (explaining that purchasers of
insurance often do not receive the details of their policies until after they have entered into
an agreement to purchase the insurance).
70. See Lashner, supra note 67, at 1176.
71. See Stewart Macaulay, Non-contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study,
28 AM. SOC. REV. 55, 59 (1963); William C. Whitford, Strict Products Liability and the
Automobile Industry: Much Ado About Nothing, 1968 WIS. L. REV. 83, 143–53.
72. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. b; Rakoff, supra note 66, at
1179 n.23.
73. See Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion—Some Thoughts About Freedom of
Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 630 & n.3 (1943).
74. See Rakoff, supra note 66, at 1176, 1185; Lashner, supra note 67, at 1176.
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Under traditional theory, as long as the adherent had an opportunity to read
the contract, all the terms of the contract will be enforceable against him,
with few exceptions.75 However, courts have backed off how much they
are willing to hold adherents accountable for what they sign in response to
this contradiction between theory and reality.76
The other major feature of adhesion contracts that scholars are wary of is
the lack of choice that is given to the consumer.77 However, the phrase
“lack of choice” should not be taken in a literal sense.78 In a competitive
market, a consumer will typically be able to shop around for a different set
of contractual terms within standardized agreements.79 Nevertheless,
“[w]hen avoiding the undesired consequences seems of such overriding
importance as to drive from the mind of the chooser all other
considerations, we sometimes speak of his choice as being eliminated.”80
This perception of lack of choice is more likely to occur when an industry is
built upon the use of standard form contracts.81 Realizing that he is the
weaker party, the consumer is left unable to bargain for better terms.82
2. Insurance Contracts As Contracts of Adhesion
Insurance contracts have traditionally embodied the telltale
characteristics of adhesion contracts,83 and they are generally accepted as
such.84 In fact, courts often ignore or downplay evidence that individual
insurance policies are not adhesion contracts.85 Although classification as
an adhesion contract by itself is not that important, the belief that insurance

75. Rakoff, supra note 66, at 1185 (noting that the adherent is usually only excused
when he can prove that the drafting party affirmatively participated in creating the adherent’s
confusion).
76. See infra Part II.B.2.
77. See Slawson, supra note 69, at 549–50; Lashner, supra note 67, at 1176.
78. See Slawson, supra note 69, at 549–50 (describing lack of choice as an equivalent to
coercion and acknowledging that there is usually always a literal choice that the adherent can
make); Rakoff, supra note 66, at 1222 (referencing the back and forth between an appliance
salesman and a consumer and noting that while there will be haggling over some terms, the
consumer will ultimately concede to many provisions in the salesman’s form contract).
79. Rakoff, supra note 66, at 1179 (observing that customers generally only shop around
for contractual provisions that immediately impact them (cash or credit), are easily
comparable (size of payment), or are traditionally differentiated within a particular industry
(warranties on consumer products)).
80. Slawson, supra note 69, at 549.
81. See id. at 550.
82. See id. at 549–50; Lashner, supra note 67, at 1176.
83. See Rakoff, supra note 66, at 1177, 1269 (acknowledging that insurance contracts
are illustrative of the seven characteristics that traditionally define contracts of adhesion).
84. See id.; see also James M. Fischer, Why Are Insurance Contracts Subject to Special
Rules of Interpretation?: Text Versus Context, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 995, 1013 (1992); Lashner,
supra note 67, at 1175, 1177 n.15 (noting that the term “contract of adhesion” was first
introduced in an article that concentrated on insurance contracts); Harry F. Perlet, III, The
Insurance Contract and the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectation, 6 FORUM 116, 117 (1970).
85. See Fischer, supra note 84, at 1013.
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contracts frequently create a lack of choice and go unread by consumers has
led some to criticize the insurance industry.86
One main reason asserted to support the argument that the insurance
industry does not provide adequate choice to consumers is the disparity in
bargaining power. This disparity is mainly a result of the insurance
industry’s structure and the lack of information provided to consumers.87
Since the eighteenth century, the insurance industry has consisted of
relatively few sophisticated insurers servicing a large general public that has
little experience with contracting.88 While the industry has grown, freedom
of choice has not necessarily increased.89
In addition, the manner in which insurers engage with their customers
plays a large role in disincentivizing the insured from carefully reading over
the policy.90 The most obvious issue with the process is that the insured
often will agree to a contract and begin making premium payments before
ever actually receiving the terms of the policy.91 Some scholars argue that
this industry custom hinders the insured’s ability and motivation to
understand the details of the policy.92
Furthermore, upon receiving a policy, many individuals may feel
overwhelmed by the complexity of the agreement and deduce that they
would not be able to understand the terms even if they did read it.93
Scholars have claimed that the perceived incapability to bargain and lack of
choice takes away any reason for the insured to read his contract.94 As a
result, the insured is often not aware of details within the policy that may
limit his coverage, such as the exclusion clauses.95
86. See Spychalski v. MFA Life Ins. Co., 620 S.W.2d 388, 392–93 & n.5 (Mo. Ct. App.
1981) (noting that an insured’s assent to the policy terms is “resembled rather than actual”);
Rakoff, supra note 66, at 1177, 1225–29; Slawson, supra note 69, at 539–41.
87. See Perlet, supra note 84, at 117; Susan Randall, Freedom of Contract in Insurance,
14 CONN. INS. L.J. 107, 124–25 (2008). But see Fischer, supra note 84, at 1017 (asserting
that courts have failed to realize that a disparity in bargaining power may have no effect on
the fairness of a contract).
88. See Perlet, supra note 84, at 117. In 2012, there were a total of 2,660
property/casualty insurance companies operating in the United States. Industry Overview,
U.S. INS. INFO. INST., http://www.iii.org/facts_statistics/industry-overview.html (last visited
Sept. 20, 2013). As of August 2013, there were 798 property/casualty insurers registered in
New York State. Insurance Company Search, N.Y. ST. DEPARTMENT OF FIN. SERVICES,
https://myportal.dfs.ny.gov/web/guest-applications/ins.-company-search (last visited Sept.
20, 2013) (search “Property/Casualty Insurers” under the “Org Type” drop down menu).
However, many of these insurers belong to the same parent company. See id. For example,
there are eight separate companies registered in New York that belong to the Allstate
Insurance Group. Id.
89. See Randall, supra note 87, at 124–25.
90. See Lashner, supra note 67, at 1180–81.
91. See id. at 1180; see also Slawson, supra note 69, at 540.
92. See Lashner, supra note 67, at 1180; see also Slawson, supra note 69, at 540.
93. See Lashner, supra note 67, at 1180. Even business people and lawyers may find it
too onerous to read through all of the complex legal terminology of an insurance contract.
See Rakoff, supra note 66, at 1177, 1179 n.22.
94. See Lashner, supra note 67, at 1180; see also Slawson, supra note 69, at 549–53.
95. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Reeves, 136 Cal. Rptr. 159, 161–63 (Ct. App. 1977) (noting
that an exclusion clause was added to an insurance contract renewal without being called to
the consumer’s attention); Campione v. Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 375 N.E.2d 129, 130–32
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These issues are compounded by the difficulty that a consumer faces
when he attempts to retrieve a copy of the policy, or any pertinent
information regarding coverage, before actually purchasing insurance.96
While many consumers rely on their insurance agents for guidance,
insurance agents often do not have a particularized understanding of the
more complicated terms within the different policies they sell.97 Moreover,
insurance agents’ compensation incentives may not always align with the
best interests of their clients.98 Obtaining information from insurers’
websites is also often hit or miss,99 while television commercials are
essentially void of all factual description.100
Finally, one would think that a state insurance regulator would be able to
provide useful information, especially in light of the fact an insurer is
required to file its policies with the state.101 However, it is not uncommon
to find that a state does not have complete and up-to-date policies to
provide to consumers.102
3. Usefulness of Standardization in the Insurance Context
Based on the foregoing description, the term “contract of adhesion” has a
tendency to conjure up images of a ruthless, all-powerful conglomerate
forcing a nonnegotiable, standardized contract onto a helpless individual.103
However, there is little doubt that a vast majority of contracts that are
The reason for this
entered into are standard form contracts.104
phenomenon is that standardized contracts are useful to society in many
ways.105 In fact, standard contracts are essential to the existence of the
insurance industry.106
For insurers to properly distribute risk amongst individuals that are
similarly situated, the terms of each contract must be identical to each

(Ill. App. Ct. 1978) (acknowledging that the plaintiff was unaware of an exclusion clause
that, if properly submitted to the state for approval, would have prevented his ability to
recover).
96. See Daniel Schwarcz, Reevaluating Standardized Insurance Policies, 78 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1263, 1319–37 (2011).
97. See id. at 1328–32.
98. Id. at 1331.
99. See id. at 1332–34 (acknowledging that some insurer websites are useful in giving
specific information while others use useless general statements to describe their coverage).
100. See Michelle Boardman, Insuring Understanding: The Tested Language Defense,
95 IOWA L. REV. 1075, 1093–98 (2010).
101. See Schwarcz, supra note 96, at 1322–23.
102. See id. at 1323–25 (noting that record maintenance rules often make it difficult for
regulators to keep policies updated and intact).
103. See Conrad L. Squires, A Skeptical Look at the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectation,
6 FORUM 252, 252 (1970).
104. Slawson, supra note 69, at 529 (estimating that 99 percent of contracts made are
standard form).
105. Squires, supra note 103, at 252; see also Kessler, supra note 73, at 631–32; Karl N.
Llewellyn, The Standardization of Commercial Contracts in English and Continental Law,
52 HARV. L. REV. 700, 701–02 (1939).
106. See Squires, supra note 103, at 252–53.
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other.107 If the pool of insureds and their respective policy coverage
provisions are not homogenous, an insurer is no longer issuing insurance;
rather, the insurer is taking bets.108 If an individual has coverage for an
event that others do not have coverage for and are not paying premiums for,
the insurer solely bears the risk of compensation should the event occur.109
Standardized contracts are also helpful in keeping insurance costs
down.110 This is accomplished in a couple of different ways. Standard
forms most directly minimize cost by saving the time and effort that both
parties would normally exert through bargaining.111 When the parties are
working with a familiar standard form, less time is needed to reach a
finished product.112 A less obvious way in which insurers save money
through standard contracts is by minimizing the costs of litigation.113 When
drafting their standard policies, insurers are extremely particular with the
language that is used to conform to the standards that have been laid out by
the courts.114 Furthermore, the fact that every provision is the same in
every contract limits the possibility of courts or juries making unpredictable
decisions.115 As a result, insurers generally know how lawsuits against
them will turn out and they can plan their legal expenses accordingly.116 In
the end, these savings are typically passed on to the consumer.117
In addition, some scholars have asserted that standardized contracts
disregard human prejudices in a way that cannot be replicated through a
bargaining process.118 Risk distribution is accomplished through statistical
probabilities and the premium that is charged is not based on one’s ability
to hire expensive lawyers that can bargain effectively.119 Also, by
maintaining a homogenous pool of risk for each contract type, no individual
is receiving extra security.120 In this sense, one can argue that insurance
policy coverage is completely without prejudice.121

107. See id.; see also Kessler, supra note 73, at 631; Lashner, supra note 67, at 1179.
108. See Squires, supra note 103, at 252.
109. See id. at 252–53.
110. See Kessler, supra note 73, at 632.
111. See Llewellyn, supra note 105, at 701. Any legal costs that come up during
bargaining are also saved. Lashner, supra note 67, at 1179.
112. See Lashner, supra note 67, at 1179.
113. See Kessler, supra note 73, at 632.
114. See Fischer, supra note 84, at 995–96 (recognizing the insurance industry as the
most prolific in incorporating judicial data into the formation of its contracts).
115. Kessler, supra note 73, at 631 (claiming that the insurance industry is the first to
recognize the importance of controlling “irrational factors” that may sway a judge or the jury
to rule against a powerful defendant).
116. See id.
117. Id. at 632.
118. See Lashner, supra note 67, at 1179; Squires, supra note 103, at 252–53.
119. See Lashner, supra note 67, at 1179.
120. See Squires, supra note 103, at 252–53 (explaining that the separation of different
policies is for the policyholder’s benefit in that a customer’s premium dollars are always
placed in a fund that is dedicated solely to cover the risks that are covered in her own
policy).
121. See id.; Lashner, supra note 67, at 1179.
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C. Rules of Construction
While the benefits and detriments of standardized insurance contracts
factor into the public policy discussion, courts will often interpret an
insurance policy based on a textual analysis.122 For the most part, the
interpretation of intentional injury exclusion clauses turns on how courts
implement different rules of construction.123 Consequently, this section
gives an overview of those rules that are most relevant to the interpreting
intentional injury exclusion clauses. This section summarizes the relevant
rules of interpretation that are common to all contracts as well as those that
are specific to insurance policies.
1. Rules Common to Contract Law
Some legal scholars have commented that the rules of insurance contract
interpretation have evolved to become completely different from traditional
contract theory.124 However, a few fundamental principles that can be
applied to all contracts are also vital to insurance policies.125 One such
principle is that an unambiguous contract provision will be enforced as
written.126 A court may not rewrite a contract to provide additional
coverage to the insured that is not provided for within the terms of the
coverage.127 After all, when an individual signs a contract, that person is
assenting to all the terms of the agreement as written.128
Based on similar reasoning, another relevant tenet is that courts are
extremely hesitant to make contractual changes based on public policy.129
This is true even of contracts of adhesion.130 Only where a contract is
unquestionably against public morals or welfare may a court act as a voice
of the public.131

122. See infra Part II.A.
123. See id.
124. Fischer, supra note 84, at 997 & n.7.
125. Id. at 1001–08.
126. Mem’l Props. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 46 A.3d 525, 532 (N.J. 2012) (“The terms of
insurance contracts are given their ‘plain and ordinary meaning.’” (quoting Flomerfelt v.
Cardiello, 997 A.2d 991, 996 (N.J. 2010))).
127. See id. at 532–33; see also Homes Ins. Co. v. Neilsen, 332 N.E.2d 240, 244 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1975).
128. See Kessler, supra note 73, at 630 n.3. The true intent of the parties is best
ascertained through a plain reading of the written contract. See Mid-Continent Cas. Co. v.
Swift Energy Co., 206 F.3d 487, 491 (5th Cir. 2000).
129. Kessler, supra note 73, at 630–31 (noting that courts will often avoid incorporating
public policy concerns into their interpretations of contract terminology because of the
importance in protecting the right of parties to freely contract as they see fit).
130. See Mendoza v. Rivera-Chavez, 999 P.2d 29, 30–31 (Wash. 2000).
131. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Jefferson, 185 F. Supp. 2d 495, 498 (W.D. Pa.
2002) (applying Pennsylvania law and holding that household exclusion clauses, which are
designed to prevent family members who reside with the insured driver from collecting on
an insurance claim, are not against public policy).
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2. Rules Developed for Adhesion Contracts
Along with these universal contract principles, courts have established
specific rules for insurance contracts, largely because of their adhesive
nature.132 Where some ambiguity exists within the contract, courts have
been very accepting of parol evidence133 to address this uncertainty.134
However, if courts are unable to sift through the ambiguity, the contract
will be interpreted in a manner that affords the greatest measure of
protection to the insured.135 The ambiguity principle is similar to the
general contract rule of contra proferentum.136 Nevertheless, the ambiguity
principle systematically favors the insured when there is any doubt, while
the traditional rule only applies as a tiebreaker.137
Over time, some courts have expanded the ambiguity principle into what
is referred to as the “reasonable expectations” theory.138 As originally
formulated, the reasonable expectations doctrine stated, “[t]he objectively
reasonable expectations of applicants . . . will be honored even though
painstaking study of the policy provisions would have negated those
expectations.”139 Though this doctrine originated as merely a description of
how courts were deciding cases, by 1970, “reasonable expectations”
became a rule of law in some states.140
Over the years, courts have shaped the reasonable expectations doctrine
in many ways, creating different variations in different jurisdictions.141
Currently, the most popular variation is that courts will only apply the
doctrine after a finding of ambiguity within the policy.142
132. See Farmers Auto. Ins. Ass’n v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 482 F.3d 976, 977–78
(7th Cir. 2007) (applying Illinois law). But see Fischer, supra note 84, at 1008–09
(questioning whether the fact that insurance contracts are adhesive has anything to do with
why courts have devised unique rules for insurance policies).
133. Parol evidence is evidence of prior or contemporaneous oral or written agreements
that modify the terms of a writing that the parties had intended to be a final and complete
contract. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 213 (1981). This type of evidence is
usually prohibited under the parol evidence rule. See id.
134. See Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. UNR Indus., No. 92 Civ. 4236, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
17295, at *1–2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 1994) (permitting the inclusion of drafting materials and
interpretive guidelines into evidence); Cole v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 753 A.2d 533, 537
(Md. 2000) (allowing extrinsic evidence such as dictionaries).
135. Mark C. Rahdert, Reasonable Expectations Reconsidered, 18 CONN. L. REV. 323,
327–28 (1986) (asserting that the reasoning behind the rule is that the insurer has complete
control over the terms of the contract and, therefore, should be held solely responsible for
any ambiguity).
136. Contra proferentum means that in cases of ambiguity, the contract shall be
interpreted against the drafter. Fischer, supra note 84, at 1002.
137. Rahdert, supra note 135, at 328.
138. See id. at 325–26.
139. Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provision, 83
HARV. L. REV. 961, 967 (1970).
140. Susan M. Popik & Carol D. Quackenbos, Reasonable Expectations After Thirty
Years: A Failed Doctrine, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 425, 427 (1998).
141. See Randall, supra note 87, at 111–18 (noting that only Alaska and Hawaii still
strictly adhere to the original doctrine formulation).
142. See id. at 114–18 (claiming that the application of the insured’s reasonable
expectations in this manner does not constitute an application of the original doctrine at all).
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Although this version of the doctrine does incorporate some textual
analysis, a court’s reasoning varies greatly when applying any reasonable
expectations doctrine as compared to a purely textual analysis.143
Underlying policy considerations play a role when any variation of the
reasonable expectations doctrine is applied.144
The basic purpose of the reasonable expectations doctrine is to protect
the layman.145 Consumers depend on insurance agents to sell them a policy
that adequately serves their needs.146 Purchasers of insurance are most
often unable to relay to insurers every specific circumstance for which they
seek coverage.147 Instead, they rely on the insurance agent to use his
judgment and knowledge of the product in fashioning a comprehensive
insurance policy.148 The reasonable expectations doctrine ensures that
insurers do not take advantage of this situation and that insurance policies
cover events that the insured wanted to be covered when the transaction
took place.149
With this in mind, the extent to which the insured reads the contract is
not the deciding factor for courts that apply the reasonable expectations
doctrine.150 Insurers know that policyholders will not read their contracts
and, consequently, even clear language should not be enough to overrule
consumer expectations.151 However, the insurer may be able to avoid this
issue if it brings the terms in question to the attention of the insured at the
time of contracting.152
Another interpretive rule that favors insureds derives from the general
contract theory that specific provisions control general ones when there is
any perceived conflict between the two.153 However, in insurance
contracts, this rule is often applied only if the specific provision would

143. Compare Home Ins. Co. v. Neilsen, 332 N.E.2d 240, 244 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975)
(finding that the exclusion clause is ambiguous and “intent” swallows “expected”, yet still
determining that an act of self-defense is an intended act by definition), with RAM Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Meyer, 768 N.W.2d 399, 406 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that an act must be
“wrongful, willful, and egregious” to be excluded because such a definition of intent is more
reasonable in light of the policy’s overarching purpose). But see Popik & Quackenbos, supra
note 140, at 429 (asserting that an ambiguity-based variation of the reasonable expectations
doctrine is equivalent to the rule of contra proferentem).
144. See, e.g., RAM Mut. Ins. Co., 768 N.W.2d at 406.
145. See Keeton, supra note 139, at 967–68.
146. See Slawson, supra note 69, at 546–47 (analogizing the reasonable expectations
doctrine to the implied warranty of fitness for intended purpose as applied to the sale of
tangible goods).
147. See id.
148. See id.
149. See, e.g., AMCO Ins. Co. v. Wehde, No. 05-0503, 2006 WL 650234, at *5 (Iowa Ct.
App. Mar. 15, 2006).
150. See Keeton, supra note 139, at 967–68.
151. Id. at 968. This reasoning may even be implicitly applied to situations in which
courts claim to come to a decision based on ambiguity within the contract. See id. at 972
(claiming that courts have “invented ambiguity” in insurance policies to reach a decision on
reasonable expectations).
152. Id. at 968.
153. Fischer, supra note 84, at 1003.
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expand the policy’s coverage.154 Furthermore, the policy will be construed
broadly while exclusions will be construed narrowly.155 In general, courts
have exhibited a strong preference for protecting the insured whenever
possible.156
D. The Role of Government in Insurance Interpretation
Perhaps unlike other adhesion contracts, the government has a strong
interest in the insurance industry and its health.157 Insurance plays an
important socioeconomic role by managing the risks that come with every
facet of life.158 By managing these risks, the insurance industry lightens the
government’s burden of assisting individuals who suffer tremendous
financial losses because of unforeseeable accidents.159 In fact, one could
even argue that modern society could not function without insurance.160
As a result, state statutes and regulations heavily influence the form and
substance of insurance contracts.161 All states require insurers to file and
obtain approval of their policy forms from the appropriate state
governmental entity before being eligible to issue policies within that
state.162 Policy inspectors are instructed to disapprove contract forms that
are ambiguous, misleading, unfair to the consumer, against public policy, or
in opposition to traditional principles of contractual equity.163 Nonetheless,
courts have generally not deferred to the government’s approval, nor even
acknowledged in their holdings that this process exists.164
These statutes also provide for specific objective standards to which
insurance policies must adhere.165 Policies must be in plain language so
that an ordinary consumer will not have trouble reading it.166 The
readability of a policy includes the style and font size along with the overall

154. Id. But see Samuels v. Blue Cross of Greater Phila., 592 A.2d 1310, 1315 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1991) (holding that a provision in a booklet provided to the insured that conflicted with
the policy and would have expanded coverage was not controlling).
155. White v. W. Title Ins., 710 P.2d 309, 313 (Cal. 1985); Blaylock v. Am. Guar. Bank
Liab. Ins. Co., 632 S.W.2d 719, 721 (Tex. 1982).
156. See Fischer, supra note 84, at 1008–30; Telford F. Hollman, Insurance As a
Contract of Adhesion, 1978 INS. L.J. 274, 279.
157. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Policy As Social Instrument and Social
Institution, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1489, 1495–1513, 1556–57 (2010).
158. See id. at 1497–1502.
159. See id. at 1556–57 (referring specifically to accidental death/injury insurance).
160. Id. at 1497–98 (noting that an individual must have the proper type of insurance for
many common activities such as obtaining a mortgage or driving a car); see also Rahdert,
supra note 135, at 377 (noting that the government has always monitored the insurance
industry closely because of its importance to society).
161. Stempel, supra note 157, at 1496; see also 1 APPLEMAN, supra note 10, § 2.04.
162. Randall, supra note 87, at 127; e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.410 (West 2004); N.Y.
INS. LAW § 2307(b) (McKinney 2009).
163. See Randall, supra note 87, at 140–41.
164. See infra Part II.B.4.
165. See Randall, supra note 87, at 127–29.
166. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.4145 (specifying that the text of the policy must
achieve a minimum score based on a test that accounts for the number of words and syllables
present in the policy).
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appearance of the document.167 In addition, these statutes regulate the
manner in which the insurer presents the policy to the insured.168 When a
policy falls short of any legislatively imposed standard, courts will enforce
a statute’s mandate on the insurer.169
E. Freedom of Contract and Self-Defense
Of course, when ruling on insurance cases, many courts do much more
than simply interpret the text of the contract and follow statutes.170 The
question of whether acts of self-defense fall within the parameters of
intentional injury exclusion clauses can be viewed as a question of public
policy.171 In fact, it would be fair to say that this determination largely
comes down to a battle of two of the most important principles in all of law:
self-defense and freedom of contract. This presents a difficult choice that
has resulted in differing court opinions.172
This decision is complicated by the leeway given to the insured when the
court is initially determining if the assertion of self-defense can continue to
be put forth at trial.173 Consequently, if the insured claims to have acted in
self-defense, and the court determines that acts of self-defense are not
excluded, the insurer must represent the insured throughout the length of
the trial.174 The insurer may end up representing a person who, in
hindsight, it had no obligation to defend in the first place.175 For these
reasons, courts’ decisions on this topic have tremendous importance.
The concept of self-defense is a familiar one from criminal law176 that
likely needs little explanation, but its importance should be emphasized.
Self-defense is commonly defined as a privilege by which an actor is
entitled to use reasonable force to defend himself against unprivileged,
harmful, or offensive contact.177 “Self-defense is a basic right, recognized
167. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3902.04(a)(2)–(3) (LexisNexis 2010); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 33-15-337(4) to (5) (2009).
168. See ALA. CODE § 27-14-19(a) (LexisNexis 2009) (specifying that the policy must be
mailed to the insured within a reasonable amount of time upon its issuance); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 33-24-14 (2009).
169. See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. McMichael, 906 P.2d 92, 104 (Colo. 1995); Matland v.
United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 417 A.2d 46, 51–52 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1980).
170. See infra Part II.B.
171. See infra Part II.B.
172. Compare Home Ins. Co. v. Neilsen, 332 N.E.2d 240, 244 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975)
(holding that an act of self-defense is excluded), with Stoebner v. S.D. Farm Bureau Mut.
Ins. Co., 598 N.W.2d 557, 559–60 (S.D. 1999) (holding that an act of self-defense did not
preclude coverage).
173. See infra notes 247–49. But see Deakyne v. Selective Ins. Co. of Am., 728 A.2d 569,
571 (Del. 1997) (explaining that the court first analyzes if there is credible evidence to
support the insured’s claim of self-defense when the insurer disputes his duty to defend).
174. See supra notes 40–44 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 40–44 and accompanying text.
176. The law of self-defense is the same in both civil and criminal trials aside from the
reasonable doubt standard used in criminal trials. Smith v. Lauritzen, 356 F.2d 171, 176 (3d
Cir. 1966) (applying Pennsylvania law); Gibbons v. Berlin, 162 S.W.3d 335, 340 (Tex. App.
2005).
177. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 63 (1965).
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by many legal systems from ancient times to the present, and . . . is ‘the
central component’ of the Second Amendment right.”178 In addition, it is
universally accepted as a justification for certain types of crimes and
torts.179 In a civil suit, a person acting in self-defense will escape liability
from damages that he caused.180 An attempt to restrict the concept of selfdefense could be seen as an attempt to strip citizens of an innate right.181
Freedom of contract is the idea that citizens “‘shall have the utmost
liberty of contracting, and that their contracts when entered into freely and
voluntarily shall be held sacred and shall be enforced by Courts of
justice.’”182 Freedom of contract is the embodiment of three related
liberties wrapped up into one: the freedom of choice, the freedom from
governmental interference, and the right to have the government enforce
private agreements.183 However, the freedom of contract is not just a
liberty based on theoretical beliefs about individual rights.184 It is largely
viewed as an integral factor in sustaining a functional free market
system.185 In a free market economy, markets function most efficiently
when people are free to pursue their interests as they see fit.186 To achieve
this, individuals must be able to choose their contracting partners and the
terms of their agreements.187 As a result, “it is a matter of great public
concern that freedom of contract be not lightly interfered with.”188
II. THE STATE COURT SPLIT ON INTENTIONAL INJURY
EXCLUSION CLAUSES AND SELF-DEFENSE
Intentional injury exclusion clauses are most commonly worded to
exclude from coverage any injury or damage that was “intended or
expected” from the insured’s viewpoint.189 This broad language has left it
up to courts to interpret whether self-defense falls within the exclusion.190
178. McDonald v. City of Chi., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3023 (2010) (quoting District of
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 599 (2008)).
179. See 6 AM. JUR. 2D Assault and Battery § 69 (2012).
180. Touchet v. Hampton, 950 So. 2d 895, 899 (La. Ct. App. 2007); Richardson v.
McGriff, 762 A.2d 48, 56 (Md. 2000); Beville v. Mac K. Falls, Inc., 619 P.2d 958, 960 (Or.
Ct. App. 1980).
181. See Scribner v. Beach, 4 Denio 448, 450 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1847) (describing selfdefense as a “primary law of nature”).
182. Kessler, supra note 73, at 631 (quoting Printing & Numerical Registering Co. v.
Sampson, (1875) 19 L.R.Eq. 462 at 465 (Eng.)).
183. Randall, supra note 87, at 122–23.
184. Kessler, supra note 73, at 630.
185. Id.; see also Caroline R. Fredrickson, Freedom of Contract and the Remedy of
Forced Hiring: A Comparative Assessment of German and American Anti-Discrimination
Law, 4 J.L. & POL’Y 1, 4 (1995).
186. Fredrickson, supra note 185, at 4.
187. See id. at 4–5.
188. Steele v. Drummond, 275 U.S. 199, 205 (1927).
189. Farm Bureau Town & Country Ins. Co. of Mo. v. Turnbo, 740 S.W.2d 232, 236
(Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (noting that the exclusion did not apply to expected injuries prior to
1966); e.g., ALLSTATE INS. CO., supra note 17, at 16.
190. See Home Ins. Co. v. Neilsen, 332 N.E.2d 240, 243–44 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975)
(summarizing the varying interpretations of intentional injury exclusion clauses that other
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When determining if acts of self-defense are covered under an insurance
policy, courts will either make a determination of the parties’ intent based
solely on a textual interpretation of the contract, or they will also
incorporate public policy considerations into their interpretations.191 Part II
of this Note analyzes the reasoning that courts and commentators have
applied within both of these categories.
A. Textual Analysis
This section discusses how courts have interpreted the text of intentional
injury exclusion clauses as well as the consequences that each interpretation
has on individuals seeking coverage for acts of self-defense. The analysis
will mirror the two steps that courts undergo when reaching a decision.
This section begins with an inquiry into whether the term “expected”
broadens the exclusion clause or if it is merely swallowed by the term
“intended.” Courts may determine this through their own reasoning,192 or
by finding the intentional injury exclusion clauses are ambiguous.193 The
final step is to establish a definition for “intended” and, if necessary,
“expected” and apply them to the act of self-defense.194 Although the
answers for either of these steps are not necessarily perfect indications of
how courts have ruled, the reasoning behind the answers establishes the
foundation for both the insured’s and insurer’s arguments.
1. Intended Versus Expected
The question of whether the term “expected” broadens an intentional
injury exclusion clause may be pivotal in determining if acts of self-defense
fall within the exclusion. The broader the range of actions that fall within
the exclusion clause, the less likely it is that a court will find that an act of
self-defense is covered by the insurance policy.195
One way that courts decide if “intended” and “expected” are synonymous
is by simply applying their own logic to the argument.196 Some courts have
held that the terms are synonymous because expectations are part of
intentions.197 After all, “one expects the consequences of what one

courts have made). But see Schwarcz, supra note 96, at 1298–99 (noting that some insurance
policies explicitly address self-defense claims).
191. See Peter Nash Swisher, Judicial Rationales in Insurance Law: Dusting off the
Formal for the Function, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1037, 1038 (1991) (recognizing that courts will
approach insurance contracts in either a legal formalist or functionalist manner).
192. See Atl. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 734 N.E.2d 50, 57
(Ill. App. Ct. 2000).
193. See, e.g., Neilsen 332 N.E.2d at 243–44.
194. See, e.g., id.
195. See Henry A. Hentemann, “Expected or Intended”: What Does It Mean, 46 INS.
COUNS. J. 331, 332 (1979).
196. See Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 734 N.E.2d at 57.
197. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Muth, 207 N.W.2d 364, 366 (Neb. 1973); Erie
Ins. Exch. v. Muff, 851 A.2d 919, 927–28 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004) (holding that both terms
connote an element of conscious awareness).
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intends.”198 Therefore, for these courts, there is no reason to expand on the
high degree of certainty that is associated with intent.199 Other courts have
held that adding in an element of foreseeability, which is usually associated
with the term “expected,” would unnecessarily complicate the analysis.200
Taking foreseeability into account does not help the court to define the
parties’ aims in agreeing to the contract.201
On the other hand, courts that hold that these terms are not synonymous
justify their holdings by referencing the history of the exclusion’s
language.202 Before 1966, the term “expected” was not included in the
exclusion clause.203 Scholars who support the insurers’ position feel that
the only possible reason for this is that the term was added to broaden the
exclusion and to presumably exclude damages that are reasonably
foreseeable to the insured.204 If it were not added to expand the exclusion,
there would be no reason to have both “intended” and “expected” in the
clause.205 No matter what a court ultimately determines to be the specific
definition of “expected,” a lesser degree of proof is required to show
expected injury than intended injury.206
2. Ambiguity
When courts are not applying their own theories to the textual
interpretation of insurance contracts, they often apply the same rules of
construction that they would apply to any other contract.207 Perhaps the
most basic rule of contract interpretation is not to rewrite a contract when
its terms are unambiguous.208 However, any ambiguous terminology is to
198. Muth, 207 N.W.2d at 366 (citing WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 799, 1175 (unabr. ed. 1968)); see also Farmers & Mechs. Mut. Ins. Co. of W.
Va. v. Cook, 557 S.E.2d 801, 807 (W. Va. 2001) (holding that the exclusion provided that
the act must be intentional and the damage must be expected, thereby clarifying the need to
show subjective intent on the part of the insured).
199. See Muth, 207 N.W.2d at 366.
200. See id. (noting that such a rule is difficult to apply to case facts); United Servs. Auto.
Ass’n v. Elitzky, 517 A.2d 982, 987 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986).
201. See Elitzky, 517 A.2d at 987 (describing foreseeability as a technical legal concept).
202. See, e.g., Farm Bureau Town & Country Ins. Co. of Mo. v. Turnbo, 740 S.W.2d 232,
236 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
203. Id.
204. See Hentemann, supra note 195, at 332. But see James A. Fischer, The Exclusion
from Insurance Coverage of Losses Caused by the Intentional Acts of the Insured: A Policy
in Search of a Justification, 30 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 95, 125–26 (1990) (noting that while
this approach would make sense linguistically, allowing “intended” and “expected” to take
on separate meanings would create unintended consequences that run counter to public
policy, such as excluding negligent acts from policy coverage).
205. Atl. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 734 N.E.2d 50, 57 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2000); John Dwight Ingram, The “Expected or Intended” Exclusion Clause in
Liability Insurance Policies: What Should It Exclude?, 13 WHITTIER L. REV. 713, 715
(1992) (acknowledging that this interpretation is consistent with the rule of contract that no
word should be ignored if it can serve a reasonable purpose).
206. See Tri-S Corp. v. W. World Ins. Co. 135 P.3d 82, 103 n.8 (Haw. 2006); Am. Acad.
of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 734 N.E.2d at 57; Turnbo, 740 S.W.2d at 236.
207. See supra Part I.C.1.
208. See Home Ins. Co. v. Neilsen, 332 N.E.2d 240, 244 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975).
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be resolved against the contract drafter (the insurer).209 Ultimately, a
contract is unambiguous when it can be given a definite legal meaning or
interpretation.210 While this definition seems straightforward, determining
what constitutes ambiguous terminology is a little more complex.
Generally, courts have viewed the question of contractual ambiguity
using either a contextual plain meaning approach211 or a reasonable person
standard.212 The method that courts choose largely determines whether the
intentional injury exclusion clause is found to be ambiguous.213 If there is
ambiguity, the clause will be read in favor of the insured, making it more
likely that acts of self-defense would be covered by the policy.214
a. Contextual Plain Meaning View
In those jurisdictions that choose to implement a plain meaning approach,
courts only focus on the terms within the contract and, if necessary, the
circumstances under which the contract was formed.215 Vaguely defined
terms, coupled with evidence that the parties had different understandings
of the meaning of the terms, would constitute ambiguity.216 Also,
ambiguity can be found where the contents of different sections within the
contract contradict one another.217
When interpreted in this manner, intentional injury exclusion clauses are
usually viewed as unambiguous.218 While courts may have differing
opinions regarding the precise definitions of “intended” and “expected,”219
these terms are far from obscure for the layman.220 Furthermore, as the
Supreme Court of Mississippi articulated in United States Fidelity &
Guaranty Co. v. Omnibank,221 the exclusion clause is perfectly consistent
with the overarching premise that insurance policies are meant to cover
209. Stone Container Corp. v. Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co., 165 F.3d
1157, 1161–62 (7th Cir. 1999) (applying Illinois law and noting that this rule has greater
force in the insurance setting).
210. Lopez-Franco v. Hernandez, 351 S.W.3d 387, 394 (Tex. App. 2011).
211. See, e.g., U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Omnibank, 812 So. 2d 196, 199–200 (Miss.
2002).
212. See, e.g., Neilsen, 332 N.E.2d at 243–44.
213. Compare Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Thrift-Mart, Inc., 285 S.E.2d 566, 571 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1981), with United Servs. Auto. Ass’n v. Elitzky, 517 A.2d 982, 986–89 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1986).
214. See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Poomaihealani, 667 F. Supp. 705, 709 (D.
Haw. 1987) (applying Hawaii law); Bamert v. Johnson, 909 So. 2d 705, 709–10 (La. Ct.
App. 2005). But see Neilsen, 332 N.E.2d at 243–44 (holding that self-defense was not
covered by the policy even though the exclusion clause was read in favor of the insured).
215. See Thrift-Mart, 285 S.E.2d at 571–72; Omnibank, 812 So. 2d at 199–200.
216. Thrift-Mart, 285 S.E.2d at 571.
217. See Omnibank, 812 So. 2d at 199–200.
218. See, e.g., id. But see N. Bank v. Cincinnati Ins. Cos., 125 F.3d 983, 986–87 (6th Cir.
1997) (applying Michigan law and holding that an insurance policy that lists a number of
intentional torts as covered by the policy yet also incorporates an intentional injury exclusion
clause is inherently ambiguous).
219. See supra Part II.A.1.
220. See Thrift-Mart, 285 S.E.2d at 571–72.
221. 812 So. 2d at 196.
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“occurrences.”222 Occurrences are defined as accidents, and accidents
produce unintended and unexpected results.223 Therefore, expected or
intended injury from the standpoint of the insured cannot be the result of an
accident and is not covered by the terms of the policy.224 In the end, a
finding that the clause is unambiguous will usually favor the insurer as both
the terms “intentional” and “expected” will be applied.225
b. Reasonable Interpretation View
In those jurisdictions that do not follow the plain meaning approach,
courts make a determination of ambiguity by ascertaining if there is more
than one reasonable interpretation of the language in question.226 This
threshold is easily satisfied with respect to intentional injury exclusion
clauses, because courts around the country have reached many different
holdings when interpreting the impact that this clause has on insurance
coverage.227 Once this threshold has been met, the court will interpret the
clause in a way that is most favorable to the insured.228 This may mean that
the narrower standard of intent to injure must be shown to exclude the
resulting injury from coverage.229 Alternatively, the court may simply
determine that imposing upon the insurer the duty to cover acts of selfdefense is the most favorable reading of the exclusion clause.230
3. Definition of Intent
When a court finds that the insured’s actions will be excluded only if
they were intentional, the court’s definition of intent almost always
determines whether an act of self-defense is excluded.231 While this
definition varies between jurisdictions, seemingly all courts agree that the

222. Id. at 199–200.
223. Id.
224. See id. at 200.
225. See Thrift-Mart, 285 S.E.2d at 572 (holding that where there is no ambiguity, the
only issue in the case is to apply the insured’s actions to the plain meaning of the policy).
226. See George v. Auto. Club of S. Cal., 135 Cal. Rptr. 3d 480, 489 (Ct. App. 2011);
Bamert v. Johnson, 909 So. 2d 705, 709–10 (La. Ct. App. 2005) (using the fact that the law
is unsettled in relation to self-defense as an indication of ambiguity).
227. Home Ins. Co. v. Neilsen, 332 N.E.2d 240, 243–44 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975); United
Servs. Auto. Ass’n v. Elitzky, 517 A.2d 982, 986–89 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (“[A] term is
ambiguous only ‘if reasonably intelligent men on considering it in the context of the entire
policy would honestly differ as to its meaning.’” (quoting Erie Ins. Exch. v. Transamerica
Ins. Co., 507 A.2d 389, 392 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986))).
228. See Elitzky, 517 A.2d at 987. But see Neilsen, 332 N.E.2d at 244 (interpreting the
clause in a manner that is most favorable to the insured yet ruling against him).
229. Neilsen, 332 N.E.2d at 243–44.
230. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Poomaihealani, 667 F. Supp. 705, 709 (D. Haw.
1987); Bamert, 909 So. 2d at 709–10.
231. See, e.g., Poomaihealani, 667 F. Supp. at 709; Bamert, 909 So. 2d at 709–10. But
see Farmers & Mechs. Mut. Ins. Co. of W. Va. v. Cook, 557 S.E.2d 801, 809 (W. Va. 2001)
(construing the purpose of self-defense in such a way that there would be no intent to injure
under any definition).
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injury itself must be intended, not the act.232 This protects the insured from
being denied coverage when the harm caused was a complete accident.233
This reasoning also protects the insured when the type or magnitude of
injury that results is different from what was anticipated.234
Moreover, even the basic definition of intent as applied to exclusion
clauses is designed to protect the insured.235 “Absent exceptional
circumstances that objectively establish the insured’s intent to injure, [a
court] will look to the insured’s subjective intent to determine intent to
While courts differ on what constitutes “exceptional
injure.”236
circumstances,” this quote accurately describes a court’s baseline
application of “intended” as it is used in the exclusion clause.237
a. Straightforward Approach
In some jurisdictions, applying subjective intent to an act of self-defense
leads to the direct conclusion that such an act is intentional and, therefore,
excluded from coverage.238 For example, in Home Insurance Co. v.
Neilsen,239 the Court of Appeals of Indiana held that when the insured
delivered a deliberate blow to his neighbor’s face, the insured was not
entitled to coverage even if he did not start the fight.240 The court held that
a claim of self-defense only goes towards motive or justification, which is
not contemplated within the exclusion clause.241
Courts that follow this line of reasoning have held that a person acting in
self-defense subjectively desires to inflict harm upon another individual.242
Consequently, that person intended his actions and falls within the
exclusion clause.243 The overarching goal of protecting oneself is
232. See West ex rel. West v. Watson, 799 So. 2d 1189, 1191 n.2 (La. Ct. App. 2001)
(noting that the provision is an intentional injury exclusion, not an intentional act exclusion);
Elitzky, 517 A.2d at 987.
233. See Hentemann, supra note 195, at 332 (using an example where an individual’s
decision to speed may be intentional, but even if she has a car accident and injures another
person, she did not intend any harm).
234. Elitzky, 517 A.2d at 987; see also Berlekamp Plastics, Inc. v. Buckeye Union Ins.
Co., 705 N.E.2d 696, 702 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (holding that the particular resulting injury
must have been intended). But see Ga. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Purvis, 444 S.E.2d 109,
110 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994) (“[S]uch an exclusion is applicable . . . even if the actual, resulting
injury is different either in kind or magnitude from that intended or expected.” (emphasis
omitted) (quoting Stein v. Massachusetts Bay Ins. Co., 324 S.E.2d 510, 511 (Ga. Ct. App.
1984)).
235. Voorhees v. Preferred Mut. Ins. Co., 607 A.2d 1255, 1265 (N.J. 1992).
236. Id.
237. See Am. Family Ins. Co. v. Walser, 628 N.W.2d 605, 611–14 (Minn. 2001) (holding
that “intent” includes actual intent to injure in addition to actions where harm is so
substantially certain that such actions may be classified as intentional as a matter of law).
238. See Clemmons v. Am. States Ins. Co., 412 So. 2d 906, 909–10 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1982); Home Ins. Co. v. Neilsen, 332 N.E.2d 240, 244 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975).
239. 332 N.E.2d at 240.
240. Id. at 244.
241. See id.
242. See, e.g., Clemmons, 412 So. 2d at 909.
243. See id. at 909–10.
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completely detached from the act and immediate result of injuring the initial
aggressor.244
b. Nuanced Interpretation
Nevertheless, the definition of intent can become muddled when a few
key issues are taken into account. Courts must decide to what extent they
will entertain the assertion that the act of the insured was not conscious and,
therefore, could not be intentional.245 In terms of self-defense, the answer
to this question is very important, as some courts have accepted the theory
that self-defense can be a reflex.246
For instance, in Vermont Mutual Insurance Co. v. Walukiewicz,247 the
Supreme Court of Connecticut held that an insured that grabbed an
individual and tossed him off a porch and down a flight of steps was
allowed to present evidence that his actions were in self-defense.248
Furthermore, the court indicated that if the insured could show that he acted
in self-defense, he would be entitled to coverage under his insurance
policy.249 Courts that apply this reasoning hold that as long as the insured
justifiably reacted within a short period of time, he cannot be charged with
any intent as contemplated by the exclusion clause.250
Another interpretive issue courts face is whether a person acting in selfdefense actually desires to injure the attacker. A number of courts have
held that an individual in such a situation is not acting for the purpose of
injuring anyone.251 Rather, a person acting in self-defense is acting with
the intent to protect himself.252 The individual has been thrust into a
situation he had no control over, and is merely attempting to avoid harm.253
244. See id. (finding little difference between a person injuring another in self-defense
and a robber who shot and attempted to kill his pursuers).
245. Compare Eubanks v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 393 S.E.2d 452, 455 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1990) (holding that the insured’s insanity does not negate his intent as a matter of law),
with Inzinna v. Walcott, 868 So. 2d 721, 726 (La. Ct. App. 2003) (allowing a determination
of consciousness to be litigated).
246. See Vt. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Walukiewicz, 966 A.2d 672, 682 (Conn. 2009) (holding that
acts of self-defense are “by their very nature instinctive, spontaneous and unplanned”);
Inzinna, 868 So. 2d at 726 (recognizing that “the instinct of self-preservation is primordial”);
W. Fire Ins. Co. v. Persons, 393 N.W.2d 234, 238 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (finding selfdefense to be consistent with an accident as defined in the insurance policy). But see
Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 911 F. Supp. 230, 231, 234 (S.D. Miss. 1995)
(holding that when the insured saw his mother being pushed and came to her defense, he was
not acting under an involuntary impulse).
247. 966 A.2d at 672.
248. Id. at 674, 683–84.
249. See id. at 682–83.
250. See id.; Inzinna, 868 So. 2d at 726. But see State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Marshall,
554 So. 2d 504, 505 (Fla. 1989) (holding that because both assault and self-defense are often
impulsive and reactive, and assault falls within the exclusion, so should self-defense).
251. Farmers & Mechs. Mut. Ins. Co. of W. Va. v. Cook, 557 S.E.2d 801, 809–10 (W.
Va. 2001); see also Watkins v. S. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 370 S.W.3d 848, 854 (Ark.
2009); Walukiewicz, 966 A.2d at 682; Allstate Ins. Co. v. Novak, 313 N.W.2d 636, 640–41
(Neb. 1981).
252. Novak, 313 N.W.2d at 640–41.
253. See Walukiewicz, 966 A.2d at 682.
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As a result, these courts focus on the insured’s principal intent of protecting
himself.254 This approach would force insurers to cover acts of self-defense
in spite of an intentional injury exclusion clause.255
The Supreme Court of Nebraska illustrated this approach in Allstate
Insurance Co. v. Novak.256 In Novak, the insured struck a neighbor’s friend
with his fist, or possibly a beer bottle, causing injury.257 However, the
insured claimed that he only did so because the victim urinated in his yard,
hurled obscenities at him and his wife, and began to make sudden
movements towards him.258 The court determined that a reasonable jury
could find that the insured acted in self-defense with the intent of
preventing harm to himself and his wife.259 Consequently, the insurer was
ordered to represent him in the underlying lawsuit.260
4. Definition of Expected
While the definition of “intended” provides support for some arguments
made by insureds acting in self-defense, the presence of the term
“expected”261 may serve to rebut these arguments.262 The common
definition of an expected consequence is one that is more likely to happen
than not.263 However, many courts that have interpreted an intentional
injury exclusion clause to include an insured’s expectations have decided to
apply a narrower definition.264 With that said, courts that recognize the
exclusion of expected injuries agree that a lesser degree of proof is needed
to show expectation as opposed to intention.265
Applying this more relaxed standard to intentional injury exclusion
clauses impacts how courts view self-defense in this context.266 For

254. See id.
255. See, e.g., id.
256. 313 N.W.2d at 636.
257. Id. at 637.
258. Id.
259. See id. at 640–43.
260. Id. at 642.
261. Most, if not all, intentional injury exclusion clauses include the word “expected.”
See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
262. See Century Mut. Ins. Co. v. Paddock, 425 N.W.2d 214, 217 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988)
(holding that even if the insured acted in self-defense, the injuries that he caused were to be
expected, and therefore, he is barred from coverage).
263. See Hentemann, supra note 195, at 331–32 (citing various dictionaries that define
“expected” events as those which are probable to occur).
264. See Zelda, Inc. v. Northland Ins. Co., 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 356, 361 (Ct. App. 1997)
(requiring that the injury was planned or foreseen with some certainty by the insured to fall
within the exclusion); Tri-S Corp. v. W. World Ins. Co., 135 P.3d 82, 103 n.8 (Haw. 2006)
(holding that high probability is not enough for the lesser “expected” standard); Farm Bureau
Town & Country Ins. Co. of Mo. v. Turnbo, 740 S.W.2d 232, 236 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987)
(holding that the insured must be found to have realized or should have realized a strong
probability of the consequences). But see Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Harrington, 565 N.W.2d
839, 842 (Mich. 1997) (holding that the exclusion clause covered injuries that the insured
was aware were likely to follow from his conduct).
265. See Tri-S Corp. 135 P.3d at 103 n.8; Turnbo, 740 S.W.2d at 236.
266. See, e.g., Paddock, 425 N.W.2d at 217.
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example, in Century Mutual Insurance Co. v. Paddock,267 the insureds were
involved in a bar fight that they claimed to have fought in self-defense.268
As a result of the fight, the insureds allegedly caused the other parties to
sustain a broken leg, a fractured eye socket, and a fractured ankle.269
Despite their claim of self-defense, the Court of Appeals of Michigan held
that because the injuries were “‘natural, anticipated and expected
result[s]’”270 of the insureds’ intentional acts of fighting, they were barred
from coverage.271
For those jurisdictions where expected injuries are excluded, whether the
insured desired the results of his actions is irrelevant.272 Similarly, the fact
that the insured acted based on reflex is also inconsequential.273 If the
insured should have reasonably anticipated that his actions would cause
injury, his actions fall within the exclusion clause.274 Courts have applied
this principle on motions of summary judgment involving shootings,275
punches,276 and kicks277 that were made in self-defense. Courts at times
also apply this same principle based on a theory that certain actions are
intentional as a matter of law.278
B. Public Policy Concerns
A court may decide to include public policy reasoning alongside, or in
lieu of, its textual analysis. This section analyzes how courts and
commentators have contemplated the importance of self-defense and
freedom of contract, the pragmatic effects of adhesive insurance policies,
and the role of state legislatures when resolving the self-defense coverage
issue.279

267. 425 N.W.2d at 214.
268. Id. at 215–16.
269. Id. at 215.
270. Id. at 217 (quoting Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 407 N.W.2d 27, 28 (Mich.
Ct. App.1987)).
271. Id.
272. See Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Harrington, 565 N.W.2d 839, 842–43 (Mich. 1997).
273. See id. at 842.
274. See id. (holding that the word “expected” broadened the scope of the exclusion to
“‘natural, foreseeable, expected, and anticipated result of an intentional act’” (quoting
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Freeman, 443 N.W.2d 734, 743 (Mich. 1989))).
275. Id.; see also AMCO Ins. Co. v. Wehde, No. 05-0503, 2006 WL 650234, at *5 (Iowa
Ct. App. Mar. 15, 2006).
276. See Richardson v. Ga. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 678 S.E.2d 348, 349 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2009).
277. See Century Mut. Ins. Co. v. Paddock, 425 N.W.2d 214, 217 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988).
278. See Home Ins. Co. v. Neilsen, 332 N.E.2d 240, 244 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975) (finding a
punch to the face to be intentional as a matter of law). But see Inzinna v. Walcott, 868 So.2d
721, 726 (La. Ct. App. 2003) (“A punch in and of itself is not conclusive evidence that an
intentional acts exclusion applies.”).
279. Much of this section focuses on the arguments presented by scholars because courts
often fail to explicitly describe how public policy concerns factored into their holdings in
detail. See Keeton, supra note 139, at 968.
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1. Protecting the Right to Self-Defense
Perhaps the most obvious policy concern that courts address in this
context stems from the idea that self-defense should never be
discouraged.280 Self-defense constitutes a basic right and it has been argued
that this right needs to be protected in all contexts.281 Proponents of such
arguments contend that a person acting in self-defense should not be liable
for damages caused.282 To protect this traditional notion, courts have often
held that intentional injury exclusion clauses only exclude those acts that
are inherently wrongful.283
For example, in Deakyne v. Selective Insurance Co. of America,284 the
Superior Court of Delaware held that the exclusion only applies to tortious
conduct as defined under state law.285 The court asserted that the exclusion
clause was specifically designed to only apply to tortious conduct without
explaining why this was so.286 When applied to acts of self-defense, this
test led the court to a straightforward conclusion.287 Self-defense does not
constitute a tortious act, because the insured “has not illegally infringed on
the rights of another.”288 Consequently, the exclusion clause did not apply
and the insured was covered under the policy.289
Critics of this line of reasoning are quick to point out that the judiciary
should not make such decisions based on what it believes is a fair
outcome.290 They argue that public policy decisions are best left to the
legislature.291 These critics adhere to the notion that courts should act as a
voice of the people only in extreme cases that garner virtual unanimity of
280. See Walters v. Am. Ins. Co., 8 Cal. Rptr. 665, 670 (Ct. App. 1960); Farmers &
Mechs. Mut. Ins. Co. of W. Va. v. Cook, 557 S.E.2d 801, 809 (W. Va. 2001).
281. See McDonald v. City of Chi., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3023 (2010).
282. See Touchet v. Hampton, 950 So. 2d 895, 899 (La. Ct. App. 2007); Richardson v.
McGriff, 762 A.2d 48, 56 (Md. 2000); Beville v. Mac K. Falls, Inc., 619 P.2d 958, 960 (Or.
Ct. App. 1980).
283. See Unified W. Grocers, Inc. v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 457 F.3d 1106, 1112 (9th
Cir. 2006) (applying California law and construing the clause to only exclude acts that are
“clearly wrongful and necessarily harmful” (quoting Mez Indus. v. Pac. Nat’l Ins. Co., 90
Cal. Rptr. 2d 721, 736 (Ct. App. 1999)); Deakyne v. Selective Ins. Co. of Am., 728 A.2d
569, 572 (Del. 1997) (“[C]lause is designed to prevent persons from insuring themselves
against their own intentionally tortious conduct.”); W. Fire Ins. Co. v. Persons, 393 N.W.2d
234, 237 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that the clause prevents the insured from
committing “wanton and malicious acts”); Cook, 557 S.E.2d at 809 (holding that the insured
must act in a way that the law forbids). Statutory exclusions may be construed in the same
way. See Tibert v. Nodak Mut. Ins. Co., 816 N.W.2d 31, 36–38 (N.D. 2012).
284. 728 A.2d at 569.
285. Id. at 572–73 (noting that courts have often referred to the clause as the “intentional
tort exclusion”).
286. Id.
287. Id. at 574.
288. See id.
289. See id.
290. See Slayko v. Sec. Mut. Ins. Co., 774 N.E.2d 208, 211–12 (N.Y. 2002); Popik &
Quackenbos, supra note 140, at 434–35. But see Slawson, supra note 69, at 534–35 (arguing
that society expects judges to abide by a general standard of fairness and that judicial
policymaking is important to better serve the needs of citizens).
291. See Slayko, 774 N.E.2d at 211–12.
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opinion.292 Furthermore, scholars favoring insurers argue that the insurance
industry should not be burdened with the financial costs that arise with
attempting to preserve the right to self-defense on a case-by-case basis.293
Ultimately, they believe that such a complex wealth transfer that affects an
entire industry should be left in the hands of elected policymakers.294
In addition, some courts that have ruled in favor of insurers have held
that although self-defense is important, it must be excluded for pragmatic
reasons.295 An insurer is obligated to defend the insured where the
underlying complaint creates the reasonable possibility that the insured’s
actions will be covered.296 Avoiding its obligation to defend the insured is
very difficult,297 and the insurer must continue to defend until all theories of
recovery are exhausted.298 Given the difficulty that often comes with
determining who started a fight,299 all parties are likely to claim selfdefense.300 In the end, some courts and scholars have asserted that
insurance companies would litigate more cases, their costs would increase,
and these costs would inevitably be passed on to consumers in the wasteful
form of increased premiums.301
2. Maintaining the Freedom of Contract
Furthermore, the court highlighted in Neilsen that by focusing on the
need to protect acts of self-defense, one can lose sight of the importance of
the right to freely contract.302 One of the basic principles of contract law is
that the best way to interpret the intent of the parties is by reading the terms
of the contract.303 A bad bargain does not get a party out of the contract
that he agreed to.304 Moreover, the public’s confidence that the courts will
adhere to these principles is essential for a free market system to
function.305 For example, the Neilsen court stressed that the freedom of
contract is an important public policy in its own right and it should not be
forgotten within the context of insurance contracts.306
292. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
293. See Popik & Quackenbos, supra note 140, at 436–47.
294. Id.
295. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 191 Cal. Rptr. 37, 44 (Ct. App. 1983);
Century Mut. Ins. Co. v. Paddock, 425 N.W.2d 214, 217 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988).
296. See supra notes 42–44 and accompanying text.
297. See supra notes 42–44 and accompanying text.
298. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
299. See, e.g., Paddock, 425 N.W.2d at 217.
300. Id. (noting that such a rule “would encourage barroom brawlers everywhere to cry
‘He hit me first!’ and run for insurance cover to defray the expenses of their actions”).
301. See id.; see also Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 191 Cal. Rptr. 37, 44 (Ct.
App. 1983); Popik & Quackenbos, supra note 140, at 432.
302. See Home Ins. Co. v. Neilsen, 332 N.E.2d 240, 244 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975)
(acknowledging that the public may want to have insurance cover their acts of self-defense,
but the parties in the case at hand did not bargain for such coverage by the terms of the
contract).
303. Fischer, supra note 84, at 1009.
304. Id.
305. Kessler, supra note 73, at 630–31.
306. See Nielsen, 332 N.E.2d at 244.
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On the contrary, those that support the insured’s view find that the
principle of freedom of contract has its flaws in the context of intentional
injury exclusion clauses.307 If the concept of foreseeability is incorporated
into the exclusion clause, almost any act can be viewed as intentional or
expected.308 Then, the decision depends on how far a judge will stretch the
concept of foreseeability.309 According to this line of reasoning, strict
adherence to the contract would defeat the purpose of insurance, and any
interpretation would just be guesswork.310
Others believe that contractual freedom no longer exists in the insurance
industry.311 State insurance codes are extensive and they control insurance
policies to a point that severely limits freedom of contract for both
parties.312 As such, some feel that it would be foolish for courts to attempt
to interpret the will of the parties because their will is not expressed in the
contract.313 Those that adhere to this thought process believe that judges
should interpret insurance policies in a way that recognizes the important
public policies that justified the insurance regulations in the first place.314
3. Classifying Modern Insurance Contracts As Adhesive
A contract that is believed to be adhesive is often scrutinized more
harshly than other contracts.315 Consequently, classifying an insurance
policy as adhesive can have a major impact on how exclusion clauses are
interpreted. This section summarizes the opposing views on whether
insurance policies are, in fact, adhesive.
a. The Classical View of Insurance Policies
Some scholars feel that exclusion clauses cannot be interpreted on text
alone because insurance policies are standardized contracts of adhesion.316
As such, they create a lack of choice for the consumer, and make it very
difficult for the insured to understand the terms of the agreement.317
Moreover, consumers often struggle to uncover any policy coverage details
before actually purchasing insurance.318 In the end, those who support this
view believe that textual interpretation is often fruitless and policy

307. See, e.g., Randall, supra note 87, at 107–09, 126–35.
308. Schwarcz, supra note 96, at 1298; see also Hentemann, supra note 195, at 332
(acknowledging the scope of coverage issue that foreseeability causes).
309. See Schwarcz, supra note 96, at 1298.
310. See id.
311. See State Farm Fire & Cas. v. Elsenbach, No. CV 09-00541, 2011 WL 2606005, at
*7 (D. Haw. June 30, 2011); Rahdert, supra note 135, at 368; Randall, supra note 87, at
107–09, 126–35.
312. See Randall, supra note 87, at 126–35.
313. See id. at 108.
314. See id. at 108–09.
315. See supra Part I.C.2.
316. See supra Part I.B.2.
317. Schwarcz, supra note 96, at 1325–27; Slawson, supra note 69, at 529.
318. See supra notes 96–102 and accompanying text.
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considerations, such as protecting acts of self-defense, should heavily
influence a court’s decision.319
According to this line of reasoning, traditional contractual interpretation
is useless because insurance policies are not contracts in the traditional
sense of the word.320 As a result, an argument can be made that the plain
text of a clause should only be controlling where there is an expression of
joint consent in its inclusion in the contract.321 However, based on the
circumstances of how insurance policies are purchased, joint consent does
not exist for any portion of the contract.322 Consequently, the terms of the
transactions must be judged on other standards as the courts see fit.323
b. Modern Flavor View
While it may be difficult for consumers to obtain insurance policy
information, this does not mean that knowledgeable buyers cannot shop
around and possibly bargain for certain terms.324 This may hold especially
true in light of the changes that the insurance industry continues to go
through. Currently, the insurance industry is extremely competitive, and it
has suffered like the rest of the economy due to the recent financial
recession.325 This has led insurers to seek new ways to generate revenue,
one of which is through innovative products that can help conform coverage
to the consumer’s individual needs.326
In addition, some have asserted that the idea that all modern insurance
contracts are completely standardized is a myth.327 This is true even with
respect to self-defense, where some policies expressly include self-defense
within their coverage.328
In fact, insurance covering self-defense has gained some national
attention in light of the highly publicized Florida “stand your ground” case

319. See Schwarcz, supra note 96, at 1343–45; Slawson, supra note 69, at 565–66.
320. See Slawson, supra note 69, at 544.
321. See id. at 541–42.
322. See Rahdert, supra note 135, at 337 & n.44.
323. See Slawson, supra note 69, at 550.
324. See Fischer, supra note 84, at 1017–19 (claiming that the issue created by insurance
contracts is one of unequal knowledge, not bargaining power).
325. See DELOITTE, 2012 GLOBAL INSURANCE OUTLOOK 2–3 (2012), available at
http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-UnitedStates/Local%20Assets/Documents/FSI/US_FS
I_Global%20Insurance%20Outlook%202012_011312.pdf; KPMG, INSURANCE INDUSTRY
OUTLOOK SURVEY 5–8 (2012), available at http://www.kpmg.com/US/en/IssuesAndInsights/
ArticlesPublications/Documents/2012-insurance-outlook-survey.pdf.
326. See DELOITTE, supra note 325, at 12–16; KPMG, supra note 325, at 9.
327. Schwarcz, supra note 96, at 1274–75, 1308 (“[S]ome companies have particularized
language in their policies that deviates from the industry norm.”).
328. Cochran v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 637 A.2d 509, 511 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994)
(reading the policy to state “Aetna will pay for bodily injury even though it may have been
intended or expected from the standpoint of the insured if it results from the use of
reasonable force to protect persons or property” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also
Schwarcz, supra note 96, at 1299.
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involving the death of teenager Trayvon Martin.329 Specifically, the
National Rifle Association’s endorsement of “stand your ground” insurance
became a publicized topic of conversation in the national media.330 This
type of attention may have alerted consumers as to the possibility that
special coverage would be needed for acts of self-defense.331
In considering these factors, supporters of the insurer’s position argue
that courts have put too much emphasis on labeling the insurance policies
as contracts of adhesion.332 Courts will often not even take into account
evidence that the insured was capable of bargaining.333 This is done in
spite of the fact that the last systematic attempt to closely examine the
content of different insurance policies took place in 1937.334 Critics argue
that this labeling is largely responsible for the insurance industry’s undue
financial losses as a result of heightened duties to defend.335
4. Legislative Considerations
Of course, insurance contracts also differ from typical adhesion contracts
because they are highly regulated.336 Every state requires regulatory review
and approval of insurance policies prior to their sale.337 The approval of
policies is controlled by both extensive insurance code requirements and the
judgment of the regulatory entity.338 This means that state governments
routinely approve insurance policies that do not specifically provide
coverage for acts of self-defense.339 However, courts usually do not
acknowledge that the insurance contract was approved by a governmental
entity when interpreting the contract’s terms.340 The few courts that have
done so have differed in their determinations of how much they are bound

329. Apply for Self-Defense Coverage, NRA ENDORSED PROP. & CASUALTY INS.
PROGRAM, https://nrains.locktonaffinity.com/Coverage.aspx?pID=2697 (last visited Sept. 20,
2013).
330. See Ali Gharib, NRA Offers ‘Stand Your Ground’ Insurance To Cover Legal Costs of
Shooting People in Self-Defense, THINK PROGRESS (June 13, 2012, 11:20 AM),
http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2012/06/13/497635/nra-stand-your-ground-insurance/.
331. See New Concealed Carry Self-Defense Insurance Covers Attorney Fees, PRWEB
(Feb. 9, 2012), http://www.prweb.com/releases/201212/prweb9175741.htm (explaining that
the U.S. Concealed Carry Association developed its self-defense program in response to
large attorney’s fee payments incurred by legally armed individuals who acted in selfdefense).
332. See, e.g., Fischer, supra note 84, at 1008–17 (“Decision-making by labeling is a
dangerous and uninformed method unless the reasons that lead to the affixing of the label are
explored and justified.”).
333. Id. at 1013–14.
334. Schwarcz, supra note 96, at 1274–75.
335. See Fischer, supra note 84, at 1023.
336. See supra Part I.D.
337. See supra notes 161–64 and accompanying text.
338. Randall, supra note 87, at 126.
339. See id. at 135.
340. Id.
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by regulatory approval.341 This has led to some criticism of the judiciary’s
approach.342
a. Leave It to the Legislature
Critics have accused courts that use public policy considerations in their
decisionmaking as taking on a role that is best left to the legislature.343
State public policy decisions are usually left to the legislature, and some
scholars argue that the courts should not determine what is fair in a contract
without clear state legislative or administrative guidelines.344 This is
especially relevant in the insurance industry, which is so heavily
regulated.345
Critics assert that courts are not designed to make these types of
inquiries.346 They believe that a court cannot make an informed public
policy judgment based solely on the evidence offered by two parties.347
Comprehensive evidence that accounts for broad factors, such as economic
impact, is not likely to come up in a trial between two parties.348 Lastly,
scholars argue that judges themselves are not equipped to make wellinformed decisions on many of these issues.349 According to this line of
reasoning, public policy issues, such as insuring self-defense, should be left
to the legislature.350
b. A Role for Judges
In response, those in favor of judicial policymaking have pointed out the
inadequacies of an administratively controlled system.351 Perhaps the
biggest issue is that administrative agencies are unable to keep up with the
ever-changing insurance marketplace.352 Agencies are often disorganized
in their record keeping and, as a result, they are unable to understand the

341. Id. at 138–40 (noting that courts have held that insurance regulator approval is
entitled to no deference, “some consideration,” “great respect,” “great weight,” or
“deference”).
342. See infra Part II.B.4.a.
343. See Popik & Quackenbos, supra note 140, at 433 (“One of the chief vices of the
reasonable expectations doctrine is that it turns every court into a mini-legislature.”);
Squires, supra note 103, at 255–56.
344. Swisher, supra note 191, at 1062–63.
345. See Randall, supra note 87, at 141 (noting that some statutes explicitly provide that
the insurance regulator is to make all public policy determinations).
346. See Squires, supra note 103, at 255–56.
347. See id.
348. See id. at 255.
349. See id. at 256.
350. See Swisher, supra note 191, at 1062–63.
351. See Rahdert, supra note 135, at 341–42; Schwarcz, supra note 96, at 1266–67.
352. Schwarcz, supra note 96, at 1266–67.
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changes that insurers are implementing in their policies.353 This has led to
an inability to “combat[] insurer fine print.”354
Not only does this lack of organization prevent regulators from making
informed policy decisions, but it also prevents them from helping
consumers understand their policies.355 Logically, uninformed consumers
are more likely to make an ill-advised bargain that, if informed, they may
not have wanted.356
Finally, supporters of the insureds’ position have argued that the political
process that comes with the current system also stifles consumer-oriented
reform.357 The insurance industry often lobbies legislatures for looser
guidelines358 because the industry finds governmental regulation as one of
its greatest barriers to growth.359 This could potentially hurt the insureds’
representation in the political arena.360 Ultimately, some scholars feel that
there is still a need for judges to account for the interests of society when
deciding insurance contract cases.
III. INSURERS SHOULD NOT BE FORCED TO FACE
THE RISK OF SELF-DEFENSE CLAIMS
As can been seen from the arguments on both sides, the question of
whether an act of self-defense falls within an intentional injury exclusion
clause has no clear “right” answer. However, this Note contends that the
best solution for the parties, courts, and society is for courts to exclude acts
of self-defense when there is a standard intentional exclusion clause in the
policy.361 This section justifies this conclusion on a number of different
fronts. From a purely textual standpoint, a plain reading is all that is needed
to find that self-defense is excluded. Additionally, self-defense needs to be
excluded from a pragmatic viewpoint based on the structure of the
insurance industry and court procedures. Finally, the relatively modern
changes that have shaped insurance contracts support this conclusion.
A. Text
The traditional sentiment within contract law has been that the best way
to interpret the intent of the contracting parties is to look at the terms of the
contract.362 Intentional injury exclusion clauses usually prohibit injuries
353. See id. at 1267 (claiming that insurers secretly experiment with their own distinctive
policy language).
354. Rahdert, supra note 135, at 341–42 (explaining that regulators have been more adept
at limiting the effects of the most obviously abusive policy provisions).
355. See Schwarcz, supra note 96, at 1266–67.
356. See id.
357. See Rahdert, supra note 135, at 342.
358. Id.
359. KPMG, supra note 325, at 9.
360. See Rahdert, supra note 135, at 342.
361. The suggestion that acts of self-defense should be excluded is only directed at courts.
This Note does not address the question of whether legislatures should make this same
determination.
362. See supra notes 126–27, 182–89 and accompanying text.
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that were “intended or expected” from the standpoint of the insured.363
This language cannot be any clearer. First of all, the idea that the term
“intended” would swallow “expected” is illogical. Each term has a distinct
meaning,364 and the use of “or” only serves to accentuate the difference. If
this were not the case, why would insurers include both terms?365 In
response to judicial precedent in the field of insurance contracts, insurers
included the term “expected,” presumably to broaden the clause.366
Distinguishing between the terms is the most logical conclusion.
Some courts have taken the approach that if the exclusion clause is found
to be ambiguous, they will exclude only intended injuries.367 This is in line
with applying the reasonable interpretation that most favors the insured.368
While this seems like a rational formula for interpreting an insurance
contract, when a court looks for ambiguity based on considerations outside
of the contract, this method loses its credibility.
Courts should determine ambiguity based on the structure of the contract,
a plain reading of the terms, and the context in which the contract was
formed.369 Finding ambiguity on the basis that other courts have
interpreted the clause differently370 is circular reasoning. While different
interpretations may provide evidence of ambiguity, different interpretations
do not create ambiguity. A court should make its own judgment of
ambiguity based on the terms of the contract,371 not on what other courts,
which may have taken nontextual considerations into account, may think.372
When ambiguity is determined properly, the intentional injury exclusion
clause is unambiguous.373 Virtually everybody buying insurance knows
what “intended” and “expected” mean, and they know that there is a
difference between them.374 Also, the exclusion clause is consistent with
the principle concept of insurance—that insurance is not designed to cover
acts that the insured controls375—and the fact that policies are only meant to
cover “occurrences.”376 This leads to the conclusion that the term
“expected” broadens the exclusion clause to include likely or reasonably
foreseeable events.
363. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
364. Compare Clemmons v. Am. States Ins. Co., 412 So. 2d 906, 908 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1982) (defining intent such that a person must desire or want an event to occur), with
Hentemann, supra note 195, at 331–32 (citing dictionaries which define “expected” as a
synonym for probable).
365. See supra notes 202–06 and accompanying text.
366. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
367. See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
368. See supra notes 135–37 and accompanying text.
369. See supra notes 215–18 and accompanying text.
370. See supra notes 226–29 and accompanying text.
371. See supra notes 215–18 and accompanying text.
372. See Keeton, supra note 139, at 969 (acknowledging that some courts have claimed to
reach a holding on ambiguity principles when they were actually invoking public policy
considerations).
373. See supra notes 218–26 and accompanying text.
374. See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
375. See supra notes 60–63 and accompanying text.
376. See supra notes 222–24 and accompanying text.
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In turn, the textual arguments that have been made to exclude acts of selfdefense from the definition of “intended” would have no merit when
applied to the definition of “expected.” The idea that individuals acting in
self-defense are only intending to protect themselves rather than hurt
anyone would not factor into the discussion. When a person acts in selfdefense, there is little doubt that he believes he will probably injure his
attacker, thereby making the injury expected.377 Furthermore, even if selfdefense is characterized as purely reactionary, spontaneous reactions still
maintain an element of expectation.378 Consequently, self-defense would
preclude the insured from coverage under a purely textual analysis.
B. Pragmatic Reasons
Even if one were to disagree with this textual approach, the realities of
the insurance industry, and how society is structured, lead to the same
conclusion. Maintaining the health of the insurance industry is very
important to all of society.379 Often, insurers save their customers from
financial ruin that could be caused by a number of unforeseeable
disasters.380 This saves the government from assisting many people who
would otherwise be on the brink of financial collapse.381 To perform this
function efficiently, insurers must be able to accurately predict their
risks.382 Insurers account for risk through the receipt of premiums that are
subsequently invested.383 An inaccurate calculation of risks could lead to a
shortage of funds and serious financial problems.384 While a firm standard
either way would help,385 realistically speaking, only an explicit exclusion
of acts of self-defense will allow insurers to make accurate predictions of
risk.
This is true mainly because of the structure of litigation involving
insurance companies. Insurers already have a very difficult time avoiding
their duty to defend.386 An insurer’s duty to defend is usually determined
based on a reading of the complaint against the insured, in conjunction with
a reading of the insurance policy.387 Courts can be very generous to the
insured regarding this decision.388 Furthermore, the insurer is not relieved
of this duty until the possibility of recovery is completely eliminated.389

377. See supra notes 266–78 and accompanying text.
378. See supra notes 273–75 and accompanying text.
379. See supra notes 158–60 and accompanying text.
380. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
381. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
382. See supra notes 107–09 and accompanying text.
383. See 1 COUCH ON INSURANCE, supra note 1, § 1.6; see also supra notes 14–15 and
accompanying text.
384. See supra notes 107–09 and accompanying text.
385. See Popik & Quackenbos, supra note 140, at 431–32 (noting that without a firm
standard, insureds would have a strong incentive to challenge any claim denial).
386. See supra notes 43–49 and accompanying text.
387. See supra notes 47–49 and accompanying text.
388. See supra notes 42–44 and accompanying text.
389. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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This process will only tip even further against the insurer if self-defense
does not fall within the exclusion clause. Self-defense is not an easy claim
to prove, and more importantly, in this context, it is an extremely difficult
claim to disprove.390 There is nothing to stop the insured from asserting a
self-defense justification for every physical incident that occurs.391 Even if
this is only one of the insured’s theories, it would be enough to hold the
insurer to its duty to defend.392
Ultimately, this extra litigation only serves to drive up insurers’
expenses, and these costs are likely to be passed on to the consumers.393
When statutory regulations exist that control insurance prices below market
value,394 insurers may be left with no ability to make a profit from liability
insurance polices. In this sense, courts that have enforced coverage for selfdefense have seemingly forgotten that the insurance industry is a private
market that does not have bottomless pockets.
One could argue that while these pragmatic reasons show the need for a
change in the system, they do not support the idea that self-defense should
be entirely excluded. After all, self-defense is a basic right and an
important principle in tort and criminal law.395 Whether implicitly or
explicitly, courts have been cognizant of this when determining the scope of
coverage provided by an insurance policy.396
With this in mind, one can argue that the system used in some courts
requiring the insured to show credible evidence of self-defense prior to the
trial397 would significantly reduce the litigation costs while preserving the
right of self-defense. While this is partially true, the standard for such a
determination is whether a reasonable jury could find that the insured was
acting in self-defense.398 Based on how courts have traditionally viewed an
insurer’s duty to defend,399 this will likely not be a difficult threshold to
overcome.
Furthermore, the underlying fear that the concept of self-defense will
somehow be tainted is misguided. While self-defense is a justification, it
does not give an individual additional rights that he was not entitled to in
the first place.400 An individual acting in self-defense will not have to pay
for the damages that he caused, but that is all that self-defense provides—it
cannot change a contract.401
390. See supra notes 299–301 and accompanying text.
391. See supra note 300 and accompanying text.
392. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
393. See supra note 301 and accompanying text.
394. See Randall, supra note 87, at 126 (“All states authorize rate regulation in some
form, charging insurance commissioners with ensuring that insurance rates are not excessive,
inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory.”).
395. See supra notes 176–82 and accompanying text.
396. See supra Part II.B.
397. See, e.g., Deakyne v. Selective Ins. Co. of Am., 728 A.2d 569, 571 (Del. Super. Ct.
1997).
398. See id.
399. See supra notes 41–43 and accompanying text.
400. See supra notes 176–81 and accompanying text.
401. See supra notes 176–81 and accompanying text.
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C. Adhesion Myth
More importantly, there is no longer any substantive reason for courts to
protect insureds from insurers. The outdated, universally accepted belief
that insurance contracts are strictly adhesive and provide no choice for the
consumers simply does not accurately apply to modern policies.402 This is
particularly true regarding acts of self-defense.403 If an individual wants to
pay the extra premium so that acts of self-defense are covered, he can find a
policy that does just that.404 Insurance companies are providing more
choices for consumers, allowing them to customize their scope of coverage
now more than ever.405 Unfortunately, courts have grown so accustomed to
characterizing insurance contracts as adhesive that they lose sight of the
facts in front of them.406 This misguided perception needs to change.
Nevertheless, there is no doubt that insurance policies still maintain some
adhesive qualities in the form of standardized contracts.407 Customers are
often not able to dicker over specific terms within the contract.408 This has
led to the belief that there is a large disparity in bargaining power between
the two parties.409 However, the reality of the situation is that standardized
contracts are absolutely necessary for the insurance industry to exist.410
Risks can be covered with adequate funds only if they are homogenously
characterized.411 This cannot be accomplished if only a handful of people
negotiate a self-defense exception into an otherwise standard intentional
injury exclusion clause. Consequently, courts should not take a proinsured
stance simply because “adhesion” has a negative connotation.
Of course, the aspect of the contracting process that most needs to be
fixed is the customer’s inability to read the terms of the policy prior to
agreeing to them. Not only do consumers find it difficult to obtain an actual
copy of the policy,412 but they can also have trouble finding answers to
specific questions they have.413 Some insurers have taken it upon
themselves to provide consumers with important detailed information on
their websites.414 However, the overall inability of insurers, insurance
agents, and regulators to provide useful information to consumers leaves
much to be desired. This deficiency needs to be remedied before one can
say that the belief that insurance contracts are adhesive is a complete myth.

402. See supra Part II.B.2.
403. See supra note 328 and accompanying text.
404. See supra note 328 and accompanying text.
405. See supra notes 324–27 and accompanying text.
406. See Fischer, supra note 84, at 1013–14 (“In some cases, the assumption is so strong
as to allow for pro-insured rules of interpretation even though the portion of the insurance
contract to be construed was drafted by the insured!”).
407. See supra Part I.B.2.
408. See supra notes 316–24 and accompanying text.
409. See supra notes 87–89, 320–23 and accompanying text.
410. See supra Part I.B.3.
411. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
412. See supra notes 96–102 and accompanying text.
413. See supra notes 97–100 and accompanying text.
414. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.

2013]

NO DEFENSE FOR SELF-DEFENSE

243

D. Deference to Legislatures
While courts like to decide these types of questions on their own, the
truth is that the government has probably already answered the self-defense
question for them. The government has a special interest in seeing that the
insurance industry is run efficiently and provides adequate coverage to its
Consequently, state legislatures have taken it upon
customers.415
themselves to heavily regulate the industry and scrutinize all insurance
policies that are sold to the public.416 In fact, insurance codes have been
said to be so extensive that insurers are not freely contracting with the
consumer.417 The contract is essentially what the government says it is.418
Although this sentiment is not wholly accurate,419 state governments
have shown that they will control insurance policies and the industry where
they see fit.420 In light of this, the most logical approach to imposing terms
in an insurance contract would be to leave this to the legislature. This is
especially true for acts of self-defense as they pertain to intentional injury
exclusion clauses. The self-defense issue has been arising in courts around
the country since the 1970s.421 If state legislatures wanted to make insurers
provide coverage for self-defense in personal liability policies, they have
had plenty of time to make their intent clear. If state governments have not
acted, courts should approach the question from a purely textual
perspective, not with public policy considerations in mind.422
Nevertheless, there have been criticisms that the regulators have not been
able to adequately perform their responsibilities.423 Even if this is the case,
there is no reason to believe that judges are better positioned to be making
these decisions. When a court expands the scope of insurance coverage, the
insurance company is often ill prepared to handle that extra risk.424 When
premium payments were determined, this extra risk was not taken into
account.425 A decision that is so critical to the entire industry is best left to
the legislature.426 Judges are ill equipped to make a decision with such
large ramifications based solely on the evidence of the two parties before
the court.427

415. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
416. See supra notes 161–70 and accompanying text.
417. See Randall, supra note 87, at 126–35.
418. See id.
419. See supra Part III.C.
420. See supra notes 161–71 and accompanying text.
421. See, e.g., Mullen v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 140 Cal. Rptr. 605 (Ct. App. 1977); Homes
Ins. Co. v. Neilsen, 332 N.E.2d 240 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975).
422. See supra notes 343–50 and accompanying text.
423. See supra notes 351–57 and accompanying text.
424. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
425. See supra notes 107, 114 and accompanying text.
426. See supra notes 343–51 and accompanying text.
427. See supra notes 347–50 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
The issue of whether self-defense falls within intentional injury exclusion
clauses is not new, but it is important to both insurers and insureds. Courts
should decide that acts of self-defense are excluded from coverage in
policies using the traditional exclusion clause. Whether based on text
alone, or also considering public policy, this standard is the most logical
and the most beneficial to all parties and to society as a whole.

